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Side 1 1, Recorded ~~-----~--' page 1- --Jerry Autry 
A: You know, I ... 
C: That ''s · true, Jerry. 
A: Well, I trust you. You know I got into a serious jam in Viet Nam. You 
knew that? 
C: Yeah, I want you to talk about it. 
A: ... a serious problem, and even though you might keep ·my anomym,.,ity .•• 
C: I can~t even describe you. 
boy, it would 
A: Yeah, but what happens/ would come out, because I rea lly went tnrough ... 
in fact, almost forced me out of the Army. See, I would have left the Army, 
because they were determined to force me out and they set it up in such· a way 
as ... you know, in terms of assignments and everything, it was· jus<t absolutely· 
no way tnat I was going to be able to make it. But what happened is Hyatt (sp? ) 
became chief and so I went from rags to riches, you know-. 
C: Uhm hunh. 
A: . , .because Hyatt always felt somewhat responsible for me. ever getting 
into the jam to start with, because ... 
C: I don't understand that. I thought that was on your own doing. 
A: Well, yeah, it was. The reason that ... the reason he felt respons·ible, 
you see, was because I became somewhat of a famous or an infamous· type and 
so ... and Hyatt always kind of blamed himself for that because ••• 
C: Is this chair safe to sit in? 
A: Yeah, yeah., these Italian chairs; that 1 s the way these things· are. 
But, what happened is Hyatt gave permission for release of informati'On to ... 
and stuff like that, you know, so he always felt a little bit responsible, 
and he was, Hyatt was just one of the 0-6 type chaplains· running around. 
Of cou:r:s€ 1 what happened later on he went from ... to be the chief and, of · 
course, that made -me immediately ... you know-, probably if I' would look back 
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A: at it, had nothing to do with ability, just in terms· of going to Leavenworth 
and things like that, how things got out, Hya,tt had probably a big part in doing 
that. 
C: r-~ve never understood exactly though why, you know, the C0rp was· so 
.;i:nterested in having you res-ign. 
A: Well, a lot of it was· sort of a personality sert of thing , Po;t' ins•tqnce,. · 
the traditional role of a chaplain has· been, you kn0w-, a man of Goa, peace, · 
that sort of stuff and there has always· been a conflict in times of; war. r 
knew you read all the literature about, you kn0w·, what is- a. chaplain is role, 
and how can a man of God be involved in war, you know-, ye,u always- have to face 
those sort of things·. And the reg has always been, a chaplain in wa!t"time 
situation is not required to carry a weapon, which. is, most chaplains- ha-ve 
interpreted that ... 
C: That they should not. 
A: That's right. Which is not necessarily true, but what ha.ppened w:ith-·me., 
and ri11 say younger guy, you know, about 28 years old and ... so what happenea 
tc me is that r- was with the infantry battalion and I dis-covered real quickly 
on ... 
C: Jus·t in passing. 
A: Yeah, that. .. do you have this? In other words, you draw up wfien you_ go. :_. 
C: Yeah, I draw it and then I surrender the card 
A: Yeah . 
C: ... the card, I don't have the pistol. 
A: Yeah. Oh, yeah,. Well, but anyway, what's s.o, .when J:: Wi:l;S: i3.Ssigned to 
the First 50 First I discovered quickly that the 0nly way, tc mini'ster these 
guys· was to be out there with them. You know, there is no way you could -minister · 
to them and sit back in base camp. So what I would do, I would go out there and 
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A: spend time with them. But what happened in my particular unit tnat was 
a little bit different than a lot of units was the fact that my unit, because 
of its particular kind of miss-ion and realizing that the NVA were holed up in 
small groups, two or three people in different places, most, a lot of them 
were underground. We 0perated in platoons, which is about 22 -men and s·eparated 
from, a good bit of distance so what it would mean ·many· ti>mes· r would go in 
with a platoon and end up being with them three or fou~ days . And what I 
discovered that, without a weapon they won 1 t protect me. The: minute r put 
( 
on a weapon or had a weapon, I became one of them. In other words, r coula 
look after myself. Plus it made some of them kind of skittish, seme of the 
old heads, you know, and most of them didn't have any of the philosophical 
arguments or ideas about what a chaplain should or should not do, so you know-, 
it was nc, real big problem along that line. And you knoW', I never ha.a any 
problem. r think out of the whole eleven months that I was with. the infantry, 
not one time ... I remember at a, back at a, when we were on Rand R aoout 
three days, we had a little place that was called Cocoa Beach where we went 
and, guys· with companies. that had been out in the field a long t.:j.)ne. would 
stand d0wn; in other words, have a little rest. And so then when we had tn:is-
l;rttle rest, you know, get around and shoot the breeze and talk w:tth. them a 
good bit, one guy I remember asked me one time how- wa,s· T able to reconci.le 
this idea of being a man of God with peace and everything I represented and 
yet, had a weapon. And that was the only time out of the wh0le ele:ven · montfis-. 
So, r d.tdn 1·t have any· real problem along that line. But • • , and r wQuld fia,ve to 
admit in many ways I became a little, probably a little exubeirant in wflat I 
was· doing . A lot of it was minis-tery, and gee, I would ha,ve. a lot of services·, 
but it was a time when never did I go out, you see, with a platoon or · a company 
dj_dn 1 t 
when we(' : have a,cti9n. '(qu ju~t di.dn It do that , I mean we ha,d action constantly. 
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A: And of course the way the particular people we were fighting, the North. 
-Vtetnames~ 2\rmy sort of troops, you always fought at nigILt. And because of 
tfie terrain, what would happen is you would, the plato0n wel'.lld be tne,re ancl 
the, at niglit, you see, you would put out what they called ambushes, or wha, t 
they called typical Army jargon was· tigers· (.?l you know-. They· woula. g~ out 
in small-- '"'3 1 4, 5, 6 men groups·, and you would hav e the little headquar ter 
section and out from the little headquarter section you we>uld have designated · 
po t nts where you put out your tigers and 3 or 4 guys and ambush . They would 
put out the claymore (.?) mines and, you know, you would justs-it back ana. 
wait. And, oh.1 it was action constantly. And, o f course, they knew whe'l'.' e 
we wer e and we would get mortared almost every night so something was always-
going 0n. And of course, what would happen to me., r wcmld most of the· time· 
g<!'> out by myself. Occasicmally I would take my assistant. I" had a lot of · 
di f ferent as~istants. I finally got hold of a guy who had been shot up real 
bad and who came back, old George Page Csp?), he got shot really oad and 
wa ~ really quite a hero himself. But he wanted to be my assistant, and I 
talked to ... in fact, he didn't want to go back to the line , boy , he wa s-
really against it so I talked the company commander int0 le.t me hav e Geowge , 
so he would go out with. me occasionally. But what would happen wfien we would 
go cmt, we would, or what r would do is, you know I' really become pa,rt of tfiem 
and when they- would go out on tigers- ·many times, I would go out ther e w-it fL them~ 
a,nd pull radio watch and things like that. And so it was a lot of jus-t , y®u · 
know, bas-i.c involvement and realizing what was goi_ng on with. r-eally an a,ctua,l 
pursuit of war. But go back to the question, you know, militaril~ wfia, t ditl 
we do? ~11, we had a 750 or 800 man battalion. ~ ha,d i:l 5-- - fJ.ppr ox imatelr-
5 -mi le squa,re AO , We spent the year I was there, the eleven montn-s: I' was there, · 
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A: operated in that AO, chasing around those North Vietnamese Army troops 
and we killed, I would say in that year's time, we. killed.,.well 1 we killed 
over a thous·and because after six months, r sa,w a guy go fr<Mll a,n E-2 to an 
E~6. His reward was ... now this was when killing and all was popular, you see, 
"68 and •69., you know, the peace movement hadntt bit, we weren1t under a. lot · 
of constraiints and, you know, killing and burning and raping and looting, 
that was sort of, that was what war was all about, This guy was an E-2 and 
he got promoted from E-2 to E-6 because he killed the one..-.thousandth NVA 
soldier; he personally killed him, and so he got promoted frGI!I E..-.2 to E-6 ,' 
C: Out of a projected how many enemy soldiers in the· area? 
(Unintellitible} 
A: Probably, the first projection that / gave was· somewhere 
around 50,000 but that was only in, we probably had, , . 
C: In a 5-mile area of operations? 
A,: No, this probably involved about three AO' s·, because. it w.a.s hard , We 
broke them ·, up on sort of a strategic, more or less the way the AO' s were 
des'1gned was based on terrain really. My particular AO was , . ,you ha,d the 
South China Sea and they had the QL5 51, which was a road, and then you ha,d 
the city of Hue, and then you had about half way from there to Phu ffa,i, and 
that would become a square, about a five-mile square and tha,t was· oi.nz AO . 
And it cons·isted of primarily rice paddies, you know, awful lot of tree lines-
and the edge of the jungles could be found in about that five.-mile AO, And 
during this time, well, it was a hard, it was a constantly difficult time.,,, 
we had four companies, A, B, C, D Company and then we had an Echo C~mpany, 
which., what belonged to Echo Company was heavy and light -mortars, these 
four point deuce mortars and 81 mortars and we had recom platoon , And aoout 
a 80Q,,.,man battalion. We had a battalion surgeon, 0 1Jean 'Mcclune (.sp?}, a,nd 
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A: we had a ... we operated from the tire base concept. The base camp was 
a place called SALLY (.???) , that was the Second Brigade of the 101st 
Airborne Divis-ion, and out from that base camp, each battaliem had what tfiey, 
called a fire support base, which was located in their AO. My first 
one wa,s one. called Mongo0se, which qot flooded out through. a typhoon, and 
then we -moved out right in the middle of a big sandy place, fire support 
base, Sandy Star, and they made it in the form of a star and moved rigfit 
out to the middle of nowh.P.re, and we 0pe1:ated from there. Everything took 
place right there. And the fire base concept that .•• of c0urse, all your 
supply and everything, they were hooked out by helicopter:s, you know-, usually 
fr0m 
to the fire support base and then they would dispense/ the companies and 
resupply and all for the battalions. 
C: Hook0 d out? Did they have a •.. 
A: Yeah, yeah, yeah. Shinook C?) ••• ·called them hook. 
C: Yeah. Sky hook. 
A: •.• and of course, I 1 m sure, you know, in talking aoo1:1t some of the thi,n,s 
we did awhile ago about, for instance, militarily, where. did we screw~up? r-½n 
sure there are a lot of military people have a lot of different concepts One 
of them is, and which r think is significant, one that a lot of commanders just 
qot their ticket punched during this time. You know, a quy wmuld come in and 
he would qet a six month connnand, and he had to get his ticket punched. r had 
awful good commanders. I had one guy who was very vicious and in a lot of w~ys 
I am sure he killed a lot of innocent people, Of course, his· philosophy was,. 
a,nd when r say innocent , that is kind of subjective, because his philosophy 
W8,$.'1 the't'e a.re no innocent people in Viet Nam. rf they are ten yea.rs, old or 
above I they a.re in somebody-ts Army·, and especially within a free fire zone, 
He would say, hey , they a:r;e in somebqd y' s, Arroy , so yqu know, they are. enemy . 
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A: And :r do know that the intelligence people got more information out of 
small children about where the NVA were and VC or whatever, you know-, than 
anybody e1s:e , They had an interesting way of torturing tnem, you know, t:fle 
kids in particular , They would take a kid and, called tnem buffalo ooa,rds (?I 
a,nd they· would take those kids and make them lay down on the floor on their 
hands and st;i.ck their feet up in the air and they had a long, thin little 
paddle that you could almost see through it and then paddle the bottom of thetr 
feet, and I tell you those kids after awhile, it would just be unmerciful, 
you know, they would tell anything, And they really got a lot of information 
out of them, it was kind of cruel and, well •.. ask me, I don't know- really 
what you want, you know, so you have to ask me questions. 
C: Talk to me more about ticket punching. Yeah, let's talk. some more about 
ticket punching. How did it work? 
A: Nell, of course, I feel a little necessity to, you know, it's a lot of 
deftniti0n involved when you talk about ticket punching and it is a lot of 
philosophy to it. The Army by far is not the world's fairest system. The. -more 
I am in it though., and I hope I am not becoming just one of the, you know·, 
s·ing the same tune, but I think in many cases it is more fair than the 
civilian community as far as that goes. Like the academic university 
community, you know. You and I both. know how that can be. The difficulty·, 
for instance 
I think, with. the Army and let's take/ kind of an aside here, like the position 
I am in right now is, most guys see that as kind of ticket punching, not only 
ticket punching, but it is a rewarding position because guys like me usua,lly 
get rewarded, yc.u know, for instance the guys who are really out doing the 
work, who are really out there humping where the rubber meets the road, hey, 
they don't make 5% Lt. Colonel and that sort of stuff . They don ''t get pickea 
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A: below- the zone (?) because they are just not ---they· are just not right 
out there where the people sit on promotion boards see them. And that~s- very 
unfortunate, because that really sticks in my craw, a lot of it, b.ecause' I: 
think that's unfortunate. The guys who are out there where the runner -meets 
the road ought to get first cons-ideration, and they don't :because of the 
system, bureaucracy. And I think the same thing holds· true in terms of 
corrnnand. What happens, you see, is a pattern, educational pattern; for 
instance a guy who is an Academy graduate, West Point graduate who g©es-
through his· career, usually he's a guy, first of all because he has been 
to west Point, is not neces·sarily a feather in his cap I but ordinarily he! s -
a pretty sharp guy. You know he is really pretty sharp when you stacR him 
up against other guys because he really went through a good hit. Ana 
especially the guys who hit the strong Viet Nam era. But what happens- to 
a guy, a line officer ordinarily he will start out, when he finish the ·· 
Academy he will go out somewhere and be a platoon leader, then he wi·ll go 
and he will s·erve a little while on a battalion staff as a lieutenant ~ and 
then he will be a company commander. And this is in normal tiwes. Then, 
of course, when Viet Nam hit, the same pattern hit in there. Then · afteT /3. company-
then 
commander awhile, / he will start being on the staff of a battalion, a s-3 or 
something, based on sort of stuff. And then, of course I the big thi_ng t .n 
terms e,f promotion, a guy goes up the ladder, you know, 2nd Lt., ls-t Lt., 
Captain, but then when he moves into field grade, starts into field 9-;va,de / 
then he has got, ordinarily there is two or three things· that he fias got to 
have; dur ing the big Viet Nam buildup one of them is he ha,d tQ be a-major, 
he ha,d t0 have a lot of company command time, and he a,lso ha,d to ordinarily 
oe an s-3 and operat:rons officer. And that 1 s· one of the t:rckets-1 ne · fiad to 
have his ba,chel9;_i;-1 ~ de9ree, c;n;-dinarily, but because of the big Viet Nam , 
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A~ buildup, a lot of guys got it, got promoted wh0 didn•t ha,ve it. But 
what's· happened now, they all ripped, they are 9one . And the sa.me tliing -got 
true as· you go on up the list to command and of course there is- only so many 
commands-, and in Viet Nam there were 1llany, man)!'! more, but ordinarily a guy 
who was a line officer, if he was going to advance, he had to get wher e ne· 
commanded a battalion, infantry artillery off icer, he had to be a cof()ITJander . 
And of course a guy was only going to be there a year, and so tnat meant tna,t 
he commanded the battalion for six months. And, now you think about tlia,t for 
a 1lloment, from a management standpoint. That's ridiculous , How can a guy· 
go in there for . 1a six month period , be able to 9et the lay- of the la,nd I you 
I 
know, whatever. Well , there were other factors that were involved , For 
instance, many times, a guy had already been over there once, they would say-, 
an adviser, he knew pretty much the lay of the land, he knew- wha.t was going 
on basically and so if he had a lot of leadership ability, he could come in 
and very quickly size up the situation, plus use his staff officers. And so 
who can say that command for six months is not a ... is- all that bad , In G\n 
infantry unit where a lot of things are going on lik.e -my unit, a guy· sflouldn"'t 
command more than six months, because I don't think physically he could take 
it. Especially ... one 0f -my commanders almost cracked up . He did have to go 
to the hospital f or a little while. Because there is so many tflings tflat 
are going on all the time and he's under really a lot of pressur e constantly 
to make decis·ions·, where guys either live or die. And especially as 'Viet Nam 
wore on wher e we had the encirclement concept of where really a lot of ti'mes, 
the battalion c0mmanders. didn't get a chance to command hut it went on -up t fie 
ladder and it was a brigade commander and then it was a division commander a,nd 
that s0rt of stuff, which I will talk more about a little later on. But it wa.s 
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A: an awful lot of pressure that went on with these guys, in terms of 
ba,tta.l:i::on commanders, and it was hard many times for them to last ·more than 
six -months·. 
C: How· did they last longer than six months in earlier wars? 
A: Well, a lot of it had to do, I think, with ... one thing, I dontt think 
they had the transportation and to be able to move around, for instance. 
And another thing about Viet Nam, because of the terrain. A guy can get in 
a, hel,tccpter and he can be, gee whiz, he could be at the s·ite of the battle 
in 30 seconds. For instance, the scrape that I got in; the really big 
scrape, you know, that got me in all the trouble, was a kind of a very 
simple thing of ... well, the one you alluded to, you know, when you wrote 
that article was ..• 
C: Oh, I sent you a copy of the article? 
A: Yeah, which was very good, and I thought was really good. I want to 
something 
talk to you/about hypmotism later on. I'm interested in it. But •.. 
C: Would you like to conduct the rest of this interview? (.Laughter) 
A: What happened there was, we went through a lull of about three or four 
weeks and really not a lot of action, so my battalion commander s-aia, hey·, 
chaplain, why don 1 t you go out with this new platoon leader, he is going to 
-make his first combat assault. That was ... combat assault was when you took 
ab.0ut s-ix or eight helicopters, full platoon you helicopter-ea in usually 
about four to six to eight guys per ship, into an LZ, landing zone, where 
you tho.ugb:t there was- some suspected activity. A lot of them were nothing-, 
occasi~nally you would hit some bot ones, which was problems· but .• so he 
said, why don't you go in with this g.uy; nothing 1 s· g0ing on out there but 
he needs: a little confidence, you know, and I think he will feel confident 
if you are with him. S0 we had eight ships.,.no, no, no, we had about five 
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A: ships·, because we had about four or five per helicopter. And so we 
helicoptered into this area which was right in the edge of a cemetery and I 
was on the next to the last helicopter; platoon leader was· on the first one 
and I was on the next to last one. And, of course, what we found out later, 
they'd dug in, all underneath this cemetery and everything was a whole 
I , mean 
oattali0n of NVA soldiers and they had been dug in,/had been underground 
literally living and, of course, we landed right on top of them and they 
happened to have been staging some sort of assembly point or something at 
that time, and all hell just broke loose. And, of course, I didn't know· 
what wa.s · happening and boy things were going; I got hit but, you know-, I 
got, not very seriously and I moved into this cemetery. You know, I happened 
to get out on the left side of the helicopter and it was right by the cemetery 
so I moved into the edge of it. And the platoon leader, his radio operator 
someway also got in there where we. were right, just a little ways apart. Of 
course, we couldn't tell what was going on; it was just ... I mean it was 
chaotic, but the point I was going to make, I got on the radio and in less 
than 30 seconds the sky was full of helicopters. Well, I wouldn •·t say that 
quickly, but less than two or three minutes the sky was full of helicopters, 
American helicopters and uh ... gun ships and, of course, what eventually 
happened everybody was killed in that platoon but me and the radio operator. 
And he was wounded and I was wounded, too, but there was no way that the 
NVA could have ever gotten to us. All of a sudden there was a wall of gun 
ships- between us and stayed, you know, different ones were there all night 
and they couldn't extract us· until that happened about, gee, it -must have been 
about 5 or 6 o'clock at night, we were there all night, and they extracted us 
the next morning about 8 o'clock. But we were ... as soon as dark started, they 
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A: started dropping flares and it was just as light as- day all nigh:t, 
But the point I' was making is·, because I one of the rea.sons- you see commanders· 
were c0nstantly involved was because of transportati0n. 'Fer instance, · now· 
did a commander make it from say five miles away? 
C: He walked. 
A: Yeah., so you know there is no way to do that. So her-e "s· a guy, who ha.s· 
constantly got a helicopter at his disposal so, boy·, he •s· -mobile. I' -mean fie 
is· really -mobile, plus· the radio and communicaticmr he is· always· in contact , 
'For instance, I had I ordinarily I had a radio with -me all tfie time. I even 
naa a radio in my tent to monitor what went on, you . know·, in tfie battalion , 
' . 
~ cut that thing on at ten o'clock at night wfien I'd he in the fire support 
.. 
base and I would listen to, I switched frequencies· t0 tfie different platoons·~ 
and boy I could, you know, everybody would have his little book and you kneW.: 
wflere the platoons were, so, I mean, you are not only m<:lbile, hut you are 
also, you are in communication. And so this· guy, the battali<m cornmande'l'.1 1 
:r would say, I s1ept three or four hours a nightf he slept prpbqbly, less· tfia,n 
that because all the time he is going to be making deci:s±ons- about one· tfiing 
or another, and you see, not only does that poor guy have to deal w:itfi hi-s-
command, hut he has constantly got to deal with brigade commanders· a,nd a,11 
., 
echelons· of people up aoove him. The military in Viet Nam was· terribly layered ~ 
I' mean it was· c0nstantly layered, you know·, with brigade a,nd a,11 tfieir staf:f: 
people and you weren 1 t all that far away and they could just in a, tew--minutes-~ 
they could he right out at you, you know , And especially· wrth.-my· untt We 
,, 
ha,d so much going on, the general and people were always· the~e con~t~ntly~ ym.u ·· 
know, and it got t0 ne, of course, ycrn know, our di-v±.si'On com.rnande'l'.' · ana on · top 
of hi'm was· a corp commander a,nd all those other wass . ;f r0Jl) all oyer, · Eu~ope ana. 
constantly; and they had the la,yered c9ncept. For instance the platoon leader 
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A: would get down on the ground, would get in a ser-ious- fire fight; hovering 
up above him wculd be a battalion Ciommander and the concept would 15.P tfi-;,t up 
above him would he the brigade commander, up above him wemld be the divis·ion ... 
and all of them issuing orders .. . 
C: Unh. hunh ... pie in the sky .. . 
A: Yeah, yeah, and of course I have known of platoon leader-s·, C0I\lpa.ny 
c0mmanders·, just tell them all to go to hell and cut off the frequency·, so 
say, I haven't got time to fool with you. They'd want sit reps(.??) and · know· 
what 1 s· g0ing on.,.but that's the reason I would say that a, guy, it would be 
difficult to last ever s -ix months where a lot's- g0ing on. r "m sure a guy· could 
do it and if the situation, the ticket punch had been say a year, a guy w~uld 
have lasted a year. Military people, I'm sure you a:t.'e aware of it as--much a,s 
I am, they· are terribly compulsive and I tell you they get this- th.i:ng in tliei:r 
oloed and it•s· like ... did you watGh "Face the Nation'' last night w-ith. Strom 
Thurmond a,nd that yo-yo ... Jessie Helms, yeah~ And you know·, tfiey· sa,id tha, t ~ 
s0meoody asked Strom Thurmond about well, why don't you. ,, the Joint Ch.i:ef~ of 
Staff, they all went along with this. And so he produced four or f.i:ve letters· 
from retired admirals and he said, you mean the Joint Chiefs· are g0ing along 
just because he I s their Commander in Chief? And Strom sa,id I well I said, -military· 
people have this so much in their blood that they are going to do what tfie 
commander wants· and he sa,id, they follow orders·. I think. the!!'.'e is·· a, stron~ 
element of truth to that. You know that I s the big pa:t.'t of it tha,t 1·s · .i:nvolvea ·. 
Rut r- think, Cecil, to be perfectly honest, I don 1 t know· .. I ha,ve soR)e ;r:eservati(!ln~~ 
a,no:ut ticket punching. Somewhere a guy has to come to gri'}?s- w±th fiimself, You 
know-, wha,t of that sort of stuff he wants· to do: J: mea,n I r _ega(t'dles·s · if you · a,re· 
a, profes-s-ional man in the military like a chapla,in or a doctor, O'lc whatever~ or 
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Ae what you want to do and ... But it is definitely an ingrained sort of 
thing, A guy, if he has· been around the military for awhile, he knows what 
he fi.c\S' got to do to get promoted. Like, for instance, wh~t ha;ve you get to 
a.o right now if you are in the active Army? You have got to, at least, if 
you are going to make 0-6, you have to have had command of a battalion, 
pos-s·ioly a brigade. If yo1:1 are going to make general, you have g©t to have 
a brigade as a commander. You have got to have all the other in~between 
things· like being the S..-3 operation type ... as a rule, r ·mean this· is- as, a 
rule , plus-, education; you absolutely must have a masters degree, Tou must, 
if you are going to make 0-6, you have, as a rule, you must have been to the 
war college. You know there are certain things that you have to do. You 
have tc, have served on a high level staff, like DA. Yon have got tei have 
·your liver patch ... 
Ce I was going to say about the liver patch and so,rt of -me:riit oad3es- on · 
uni.forms. Is it still true that they look favorably upon a person who 
wears the ranger tab, the CIB, the jump wings; those things you've got tQ 
have, too'? 
Ae Well, yeah, I would say so. Recently, for instance, I know that ... 
hoy, this is really confidential; if this ever ... but I know on the promotion 
board I recently got promoted on this, below the zone, 0-5, that probably 
the thing that got me on was Viet Nam, because, after all, who sits on 
promotion board? You know, you got 0-6's and general, a couple of gener~ls, 
on the 0-5 board, you know, active duty, and below the zone, you know, they 
could only ... they could have promoted five chaplains; they only appointed four, 
but there were about, probably, well, no, probably about three dozen in the 
running . And I just made it into the zone by about two or three weeks, the 
s€condary zone, but what a guy told me is that ... and see you have three 
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A: chaplains who sit on that board. But what a guy t0ld-me, you see,, is~ 
that when they looked a,t the record, all three dozen records· were about trre' 
same, hut the combat record is what makes the difference. Y-ou know-, a gny 
looks down and says, hey, this guy has been wounded tw0 times, you know, and 
this guy, he was a ·member of the service and support battal i011 oack in s·aigon ~ 
and you know you just ... and both the narratives say, the guy who has· been 
in the S & S battalion, his narrative says this· is the greatest chaplain 
in the wor ld; he is fantastic. This one over here says, this· is the greatest 
guy in the world. But you know here is the guy who has· been in combat and 
here ' s a guy who has been back in Saigon, and there is no way to. ,,you can•t 
equate those, at least according to that board. They say there is- no way you 
can do tha,t. And you know that sort of stuff falls out, so when everything 
being equal, you got a guy who is sitting on that board who has· been through 
ranger school and here's two guys; one is going to get promoted and one not, 
he says hey, ... 
C: One has a ranger tab ... 
A: Yeah, he says, hey, let's give it to, you kn0w, this· guy who has g0t 
the ranger tab; I know what he has been through, so hey, he gets the nod, 
And, of course, promotion boards, they don't look for reasons· to promote you> 
they look for reasons not to promote you. 
C: That's correct. 
A: ••• And so ... 
C: You know. all of about two minutes they spend on a,ny gt~en -mant& f older,. 
A: That's exactly right. So you know, it's 6 of one and half a dozen of 
anotheri there's no douht about that. 
C: Yet, in some of the stories I hear, coming after tfie,Yiet N~m period; 
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C: some of these ticket punching things tended to be almost so proforma 
that they became ridiculous. 
A: Give -me an example. 
C: Every officer who served and who didn't get court martialed ca:Il}e out 
of -Viet Nam with. what kind of a decoration? 
A: Oh., yeah, yeah, that became kind of a standard thing and a lot <,( t :j.>mes:", .. · 
C: Every warrant officer came out with what kind of a decoration? 
.!\: Yeah, yeah, ... 
C: Every enlisted ·man came out with what? 
A: Yea.h, yeah. 
C: I'f you are an enlisted man, you get, what is the. 1\'l?Illy commendati'On. , . 
.!\: Yeah, yeah. 
C: If you are an officer, you get the bronze meda,l. 
A: A,nd usually the Army commend~tion medal, sometimes· they'd even c~me out 
on rosters. 
C: Yeah, that's right, yeah. 
A: But ... 
C: By· the way, it happens to be my highest .. • (Laugh:te'l'.'). 
Well, in the Guard, it is hard to get ribbons. 
A: Oh., boy·, yea.h, and, of course, t t' an interesting thing, I. told · scll)eone 
not long ago r hero medals, you know I with a ches·t f ull of them, nero -medals 1 ,, 
and 21 cents you can get a cup of coffee most anyplace. you 5ro. And the guy· sa~ e 
yeah, you can say that, hut you know when you don ' t have them I you know·, it ts· 
a different story. And there's some truth in that a,nd a lot depenaea · on 
commanders·. Now- I had one commander, the only· guy that_ got a, fiero -medal wa,s· 
he had to bleed a pint of b.loodf no way, 
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C: ... at the Red Cross Station, Ken? 
A: Y'eah, I · mean, he just ... he was hard cor~ . And I had another commander 
who was a little bit smarter, who said, we are not going to give medals around 
for anything, but you know, let' s make sure that we don't let our troops·, 
especially talking about enlisted pe0pler 9et left 0ut. Now· what happens, 
another thing is-, you take ... r pr(')babl y have got mere hero -medals-, I' -mean 
in terms of numbers·, probably more than any chaplain in the Army. For ins:tance 1 · 
let 1 s· see, five ... I' mean with the V device, and there 1·s · a logical exj:,lana.tion · · 
to it ... 
C: You are braver than all the rest of them. 
A: Not necessarily, not necessarily. Here i s what happens-. 'Fo:r: instance, 
let -me see how -many I got. ·Five, six, seven, eight ... ten ..• ten separate ones-. 
But you see what happens· is·, a guy who goes out and stays· out in the field 
and, you know, you go through a lot of actions ... of course, that~s- a lot of 
definitional stuff. For instance, when you are out there ... well, I i,ve jus·t 
got examples up the gazoo (?) • Here we are out and r 1·m with. headquarters- one 
day and I'm with. the company commander, the artillery FO, his, RTO,. 901 a,bQut 
si-x ... the -medic ... abeut six or eight guys, we are walking thr-e_ugh a -graveya,rd 
, I 
and all of a sudden the RTO trips a booby trap; hits· everyoody·. Hits- eve'l'.'ybody-1 
-me included. Yem know·, three or four pieces· of shrapnel a,11 in the ha.nd ,. you 
knoW', a.nd ... 
C: It -must have been very small pieces, becaus_e y~u a.re not scarred. 
At Well, yeah, I tm scarred up some. You know, you go i .n the'l'.'e. ·. ,. tfie · p,:i;oo.J.em 
is· n<!lt with the shrapnel if they leave it in; the p:r-oblem is- in diggi·ng it out. 
You know, when you go in and dig it out, so then they· have to go i:n a nd '. ca ea,n 
the wounds·. That ~s what leaves- you all scarred . Now· tfie:r:;e is:- really n0t · too ' 
S-ide 1, RecC!)rded , page 18-..--Jerry Autry --------
A: -much to that and I got one little piece still left in me that though, 
I' tell _you, cmce in awhile it really drives ·me up a wall. But you see, is· 
tfiat bravery-: no. You kn0w· anybody that's got 0ne eye and half sense happened 
t0 be walking through a graveyard ... nut what happens· is- the company commander 
0r the oattalion commander says, hey, boy, I can I t believe that, you kn0w·, 
fiere~s a bunch of ,guys get w0unded out there and here's a chaplain; he didn~t 
have to be out there; put the chaplain in for a medal . 
C: Purple heart. 
A: Well, you get that aut0matically. You don't get put info~ that. You 
bleed, you know·, you get wounded in action anyway-, yo.u get tha, t. Well, what 
I am saying is .•• you unders:tand that. I ·mean, here's a battalion commander 
says·, hey, the chaplain could sit back here reading his· Bible; nut, no, he ~ s· 
out with. the troops, he's walking through a graveyard with the rest 0:f; tnem 
and they get hit with a booby trap ... put him in for a medal. Now· is· tfiat wrong? 
Do you think a guy like me is· as brave as the guy who is leading tfie charge 
±n the. battle ... sure, surely not. You know, I was just present ;for dutY', 
that's· all, And yet, you know, how do you equate that sort 0f stuff? S0 
that •·s· how a lot of j:t happens·. 
C: Well, you were wa,lking in an appr0priate loca,tion when y0.n were wounded. 
A: In a, cemetery .. , 
A: Yeah., yec\h., I'd say that. 
C: Twice. 
A: Well, yeah, tha,t 1 s: righ:t. Cemeteries have had a lot to do with me . 
C-. There's· some kind of symbolism there, young friend. 
A: Yeah~ But , .. s0 what does all that -mea,n? Well, I · don~-t knqw_.._ rt ~s-,, .I 
th.i:nk where the real a,troc:j:ties in terms of rec\lly· ±ni;tpproprii;l,te stu-ff was· wnere 
a lot 0f h±gh,-.ra,nking officers got hero meda,ls·, and, <!If cou'l'.'se ,. so.me of; tfiem 
were br0u.ght out, you know, and, of course, some of them was in the same. ~. 
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A: ... here•·s a brigade cormnander who gets- the Silye'I'.' Sta,;ri . Well, why-· does-
he get it? Well, he was up in his helicopter and he dips· down and saves s(!Yf()e 
guy, shoots: up a few· 'VC ... well, does he deserve ... r- den I t know-. Here i s - a 
general who gets one. Well, they used to call them package A and package B ... 
Ce That's· right . 
Ae And so it's ... r- would think if I had been a general, officer or something, 
I would have been a little dubious of that sort of stuff, but it was- kind of a 
war mentality that people get caught up in, and it gets to be kind of a thing, 
where it•s- like a,ny ethical situation ... you don 1 t know· wha.t to do, Like air 
medals. Now we went through a period of air medals· .. . 
Ce r- was thinking 0f air medals as you were talking about walking through. 
the cemetery. The fellows would go up for a five -minute fl_i9Jht in a. perfectly· 
peaceful area, book themselves on the manifest of the helicopter flying alm0s-t 
anyplace, just so he could get up ~n the air and count it as a.n0ther ... 
A: Y-eah, and there were guys who would do that. rt•s kind o:t: a war type: 
mentality in a place like Viet Nam where you almost get into a situa,tion, 
Cecil, where it•· s play war ... 
C: 1Jhm, humh. 
A~ However, you know, it 's play war for a lot of people ... 
C: It•· s · play war with real people dying. 
A • . Yeah., yeah, and it ' s a type of s-i tua tion that it was·, you know., A.nd I' 
heard chaplains talk about it. One guy told -me he got a )?-urple Hea,rt beca,use 
he cut himself, you know, lea.ping into his- bunker. Well, he wa,s- l a;ughing a,bout 
it. To me, you know, tha,t was- no joking matter, but gee whiz, you know, guys 
11 
are eut there dying. He Wc\S· back around Sa_igon 0r somewhere. Of coui?se 
I 
ther e 
were· a lot of little funny things ... the way you could always- tell a combat 
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A: soldier from another sort of soldier, was his boots. A comnat soldier 
wore his ooots, which were white from walking in the mud and all, as- kind of 
a profile in courage. r mean, that meant that he was· snuffy C'P?Y, you know-; 
he was humping. And a guy who was back in one of the rear areas or something, 
he had his shoes shined by a Vietnamese Mamasan. And r -used t0 h~ve.,. 
used to get on me all the time because I didn •·t have any time for · people wn0 · 
were in the rear. Boy, I used to give people a hard time, you know·, chaplains·, 
We would go to these -meetings and here were these guys sitting around Phu Bai 
in the cluf>s and all, I wouldn't give them the time of day. And boy, this· 
guy- would say, hey, that's not right, you know. He said, you know· there,, s· 
no great, n0 big thing. . h lf . ~ . ~ Of course, I'd come out wit my se ~rrguteous ~ct 1 
you know, of how all these guys were out there dying and these guys wer e 
sitting back over there, you know, just living the life of Re~lley. A lot · 
of people in Viet Nam lived well, -I mean in terms of that sort of s -ituation 
Other$· had almost next to nothing. Cecil, have you read, and you really· ought 
to read this in the process of writing this book, have you read .;Friendly· 
C: Yes. 
A; Oh1 ha,ve you? 
C: Yeah. I have a copy of it on my shelf. 
A: Well, I want to tell you that thing had a strong e.ffect on me, oeca,use 
I tfiink it wa,s S.O much truth in that. I hated what happened to this, guy' S · 
-mother -~n the process of it 1 but I think that was· really qui'te an experience, 
There was so much truth in that. A lot of guys like tnat kid, see , were guys 
that r was with constantly·, Guys- that I saw die and soll)e. that died in -my· arms-, 
you know, I saw· a lot of them die and had a lot of those same experiences. WTcte 
a lot of those lette~s, you know. Plus almost ~ot myself in a lot of jams with 
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At parents because that was part of procedure, you know, that when a guy get 
killed in a unit, the battalion chaplain, he wrote a letter. And sometimes 
they· changed them at brigade headquarters and things like that, but most of 
the time I wrote my own letters and I'd write up one or two ... we had so many 
people killed, you couldn't write one for everybody so ... well, you could have, 
but it was, you would just write up three or four standard ones. It seemed 
awful inhumane, but many times the parents would write ·me back, you know, they 
would want more details. And a few times I really got myself in some bad jams·. 
Pll never fo't'get, this kid from this artillery F0 named 0'Cherchack (sp??). 
from Lakawanna ... 
-C ~ Pennsy-1-vania. 
A: No, no, New York. 
C: New York? 
Ar Close to Buffalo. He was a brand new graduate of St. Bonaventure Csp??l 
and he had been over there for about four or five weeks·. I got to be pretty 
good buddies with him, because although he was Catholic, but you know, that 
kind 0f stuff, people don't pay much attention to that, you know-, and a cha.pla.in 1·s , 
a chaplain. He and I did a lot of serious talking, about his· girlfriend; but, 
he was scared to death, constantly. And so I had seen him the day before and 
:r was hack at the ... :r was with another outfit and we were flying- .. • I was· cm the 
log bird, which was the bird that took in the chow. ~ had a rule in my 
battalion, we tried to get the men one hot meal a day and the· log bird w0uld 
go in from the base camp and take them in something to eat; mashed potatoes·, 
and some sort of meat. So I was on the log bird, coming from one company to 
another, and I heard on the radio that there had been s0me casualties where 
we were headed. So we sat down and I found out it was· this· guy, Mel o ~cherchack (spl 
had been blown up by a 500 pound bomb that the B-52's had dropped it, it hadnt t 
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A: detonated. It lodged in the ground, the NVA or probably VC had come in 
and booby trapped it, and he come in without any knowledge of it, and he. , . 
they· set it off. Probably they set it off, because they had a system where 
almost, a sophisticated system where they could detcmate them themselves-, you 
know-, once a guy got right where they wanted him, they ~d detonate it . And he 
was. just almost blown to pieces. But it hadn't killed him. I went with hi1n 
to the h0spital ship ... right after I got there T went over and, b~y, they 
had hi1n there and the dust off (?? l came in and they loaded him on, and I 
asked the guy, how- about me riding in with him? And T rode in to the hospital 
at Phu Bai. Doctors came in and took one look ands-aid, we are g0in9 tc 
transfer him t0 the hospital ship, he's not going to -make it . So Is-aid, r 
want to go with him. So I went over, and he lasted about two or three hours 
and died. And so I wrote his parents, and, of course, Twas able to say- some 
personal things to them,you know. - I was with your son and he didntt suffer 
much ... I think I wrote much ... see they wanted to know what did ••much '' -mean? 
So we got into this long thing, and I tell you, it got to the place tha,t I 
made the decision to quit writing them, because it just got ... then sisters 
began, you know. Just like out of "Friendly Fire" and it was understandable, 
you know, to think of a young guy whose life was finished who was just getting 
started. So that "Friendly Fire" really had a big effect on me because I saw 
out of that guy, a lot of guys that Thad known, y-0u know. So I thought that 
was really a fantastic book. 
Ce Well, reflect on this for a few moments, Jerry. 
Ae I'-m trying to think of my feelings. I'm wondering why T.,.I' guess it l- s 
the scene you have set up, too, but T guess this· is the fi'l'.'st til'(le T ~ve really 
talked about Viet Nam in a long time . Tt I s · very interesting , you know-; 
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Ce For some of the people I've talked to, it's the first t i>me they have 
ever talked about -Viet Nam. 
A: I don't talk much about it. Primarily for two or three reasons, One 
of them is, yc,u see, is like Leavenworth . You think about it. How- ·many times· 
we talk about Viet Nam at Leavenworth? None. (unintelliglble phrase) 
C: And counter insurrgency. 
A: Did we? 
C: Yeah. 
A: Well, I can't even remember that. I can't remember .. ,in fact I remember 
a guy saying, hey, when I was in Viet Nam, one of the instructors· saying, hey, 
Viet Nam is verboten. You know, we don't talk about anything in Viet Nam. 
And I'll never forget, you know, I had a concept of being ... coming back from 
the war, like most guys, you know, who come back from the war, the big war, 
you know, and parades ... when j::hrough with Viet Nam and you were somewhere . •. 
C: You ' ve been where? 
A: Hunh? 
C: You've been where? 
A: Yeah , that's right. People, say, where you been? Well, rtve been to 
-Viet Nam . Oh. You know, big deal. But you know another thing I did, is I 
took a lot of pictures and I mean I still have some, gee whiz, I have some 
pictures that •.. I had a bunch of them for awhile, I may still have some around ... 
dead people, you know, VC, and took movies. But I got home you see and nobody 
wanted to see them. I mean, I have 2,000 slides and nobody wanted to see them. 
(.laughter)_ You talk about being disillusioned. But I think you just kind of 
bury that sort of stuff , I think probably.,,and when -Viet Nam fell I had some 
strange feelings. One of the feelings, and I still believe this· very· strongly, 
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A: you see Viet Nam wasn't ... in light of what happened, Viet Nam wasn't 
worth a s ·ingle life ... 
C: That's right. 
A: ... it wasn't worth. a single lif e, and that 1 s the thing about it , 
C: One of the things· that's run through. ,my mind ever s ·ince T star tea thi's · 
project, young friend ... notice I'm not ... 
A: Yeah, yeah, I notice that. Thanks. 
C: When we were at Leavenworth, they asked for combat types to go back. to 
Ft. Bragg for a week, so I signed up. 
A: Yeah, I remember you went. 
C: Then I went to Caber Warrior III. 
A· Yeah. 
C: Yeah, went up to Caber Warrior III. And that was. our mid-East c<,ntingency 
plan . And they had that planned £rom A to z with every nut and every bolt 
conceivable, e xcept some of the most obvious things possible , 48-hour lift off 
from the USA into the mid-East. And the best minds that the Army could bring 
to bear on us fighting in the Arab Middle East hadn't thought about a water 
supply for the contingency force. And I mentioned it at one of the briefings 
a,nd the guy· was s-imply dumbfounded. Well, I guess we'll use what's a vailable . 
r suggested, do we have an Army well-drilling team? He wasn 1· t sure . 
A: That's amazing. 
C: I found out since, we do indeed have two well-drilling teams·, but they 
weren't included in the plan of operation for mid-East. Before tne week was· 
up, they came back to me and said, well, they could borrow 90 miles- of poly 
-viny·lchloride tubing, 4 -,..inch tubing, from the Marine Corp to take to the -mid-East 
with them. And I said, will that feed two and one-half divis:ions·. Well, tliey, 
' ., 
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C: thought -maybe it would help. What else do you have? Well, we fia;ve 
5,000 gallon tankers·. What else do you have? Well, we have our water nuffalos-
r- said, think the PVC pipe. Stretch it across the desert? Abdul and his ca;mel · 
will come riding up and they are thirsty. And Eben Saud (.sp?). says- to his, 
camel, Abdul, Abdul, now· we drink, and they cut it open. Well, that was, one· 
thing I ob.sBrved . Simply out of touch with some of the real needs. Or tfiey-1-re 
going t0 yank these 19 and 20 year old kids out of the 82nd at Ft, Bragg a;nd 
101st at Ft. Jackson, on 48 hour notice; I said, what are the wives ~~in9 t~ 
do? Have they been prepared? Well, yes. Can the wives sign checks~ Well, 
we haven't looked into that. We don't know whether they have joi.nt bank 
accounts or not. Do the wives know which bills ha·ve to he paid? Do tfie · w:r-ves-
know- how to drive a car? They hadn't checked. Ok, T say· that only because 
r- reflect on Viet Nam, which was obviously a political circ.Uil)sta;nce, yBt I fj:_nd 
an awful lot of the command structure involved in the thing that we wepe dis~ 
cussing. About degradation of the medal system, putting their names· on helicopter 
manifests so they could get the next device on their air medal. I find them 
differentiating between, in body counts, between a blood trail and a body and a 
body with a weapon, or just ... 
PAUSE 
C: Ok, yeah . Tell me something or other about the often cited and perhaps· 
mythical organization called the West Point Protective Ass0ciati0n, 
A: Well, let's see, Cecil, how I can start this. I have mixed emotions- aoout · 
West Point, and I think I have to start out saying that first of all, which is· 
almost totally unrelated to what we are doing. Well , I guess you haye learned 
by now· when you ask a preacher, being one yourself, no way he answers anything 
eas-ily. (.laughter) Is· that ... I've seen some excellent West Point officers·, 
I've seen so~e ~ediqcre 9nes; but I've never seen a bad one. OCS and ROTC, I've 
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A: seen some excellent oDes, some superior officers and I've also seen some 
worthless ones. My personal experience has been, I hav e never seen a bad 
West Point officer. Seen some mediocre ones. And so I,.,a part of it has- to 
do because I think I have read a lot about West Point, you krn,w-, ootfr. P :t?I:!> ana 
con. The latest •.. best, most objective book that r-tve ever read was the one 
called "West Point School for Soldiers", which is wrapped around that r eally 
academic question, is West Point a training ground for Army tactical officers· 
or ±s· it an academic institution and it really deals with. that question, 
Wr itten by some former West Pointers who take a fairly objective approach, 
but there is no doubt, absolutely no doubt PAUSE IN TAPE 
A: ... truth, you know, body count because what happened, you see, all ca,ntt 
be blamed, though, Cecil, on command. I mean higher echelons , What happened 
to a lot of GI's out there is quickly they learned the game. 
C: Uhn huhn. 
A: They learned the game quickly and I could tell you so.me horrendous stories ,. 
C: But it wasn't a game that they originated. 
A: Oh, no, no. But they learned the game because you see, what happened to 
these guys is after a few months, the name of the game became survival. 
C: That's right. 
A: How do you do it? Hey, I've got three months to make it to R & Rand 
then I've got the, you know ... so what do we need to do? We give command what 
they want, and only the stout and experienced integrity of a company commander 
made the difference. 
C: Or a battalion commander •.. 
A: Yeah, 
C: ,,.who jus-t has 26-rnore days to go before he is- rotated ,,, 
A: That\ ~ ~ight. Jf ¥9U had a company coromander who was opera.ting in that 
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A: fashion, especially if he was inexperienced and lax in leadership, 
guys could do anything they want to. I remember one particular guy who we 
had, one of my best buddies, enlisted man, I've got his name somewhere; I' 
can't remember it offhand, but was killed by, you know, guys in his· own squad. 
C: Fragging concept, huh? 
A: No, no ... see this was 1 68~-' 69, you weren't into fragging. Because 
see when you are trying to keep from getting killed, you don't fight each 
other. I mean you don't fight each other. Now you see fragging and all 
that sort of stuff came about, started probably in about the latter part of 
1 69 and 0n. But when you have got a unit like mine, like the first ~~ve o first 
who were involved in fighting, you don't fight each other. Blacks and whites·, 
they don't fight each other, and you don't have racial problems. You got guys· 
that were smoking dope, but you don't have any hard stuff even at that. But 
this- one kid, for instance, really had been in Viet Nam for about eight. or nine 
-months and he was the assistant squad leader; he was E-5. He got up to go 
take a leak and the new guy who was on the watch shot him; thought he was tne. 
enemy. And so the platoon leader was scared to death; didntt know· wfiat to do, 
and so he tried to cover it up. And yet where his squad was-, there was no 
action, nobody knew any action, but down about 3 clicks away there had been · a 
lot of action during the night, so he secretly tried to move his- people down 
to that 3 clicks away so they could claim he was killed by enemy action. But 
r think when you talk about West Point graduates, you know, you have to talk in 
te!l'.'ltls of how they see each other. For instance I have known commanders, not in 
Viet Nam but when I was in Europe, I've know of a commander to call in a young 
West Point officer and really chew him out and end up the converstation by saying 
this, that you know- you are a West Pointerr this is inexcusable, '{ou know-, we 
hotn. had the same t't'aining and so forth, and really uses· the sledgehammar, · re·ally· 
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A: pound the guy. But I think there are times, you know, there is absolutely 
no way to get away from it and of course we in the active -military ha;ve gotten 
used to things like the ring knocking and the idea of where the· guy say, hello, 
BA, you know, and ... (laughter) But I don't think you can get away from 
that as.pect of it, and with all things being equal and when things· fall out, you 
take two officers, one of them's a West Pointer and one of them' s a non~West 
Pointer, and the guy who is the commander or is in the place of a.athority 
making decisions about those guys and their upward mobility, and all things 
being equal, probably the West Pointer is going to fall out. It,. s just kind 
of one of those things. I don't think it is nearly as true as it has been , 
But I think there is an element of truth in it. I think the battalion commanders· 
I had in Viet Nam; out of three, two of them were West Pointers·. In my own 
opinion, both of them were superior officers to the non-West Pointer tha.t we 
had, Presently today one of them -is a general and the other two are 0-6~s. 
Well, one has· just recently retired; the other is a young 0-6, I guess what 
r am saying, Cecil, is that there is ... there is no doubt about it, there is·, . , 
r think that's involved. I think it to a degree was involved in Viet Nam. I do 
not think that we just necessarily equate the West Point Protection Associatbn, 
so called, as· to being necessarily all that bad. I think there is an element of 
it involved, you know. 
C: I have heard from other stories of a west Point officer who really goofs 
up, and the ranks of his· fellows immediately close around him to in a sense 
protect him from certain kinds· of ... what ... results that -might follow if it 
were not a West Point Officer. 
A: Are you thinking of higher ranking or .. , 
C; Higher ranking and peers. 
A: Well, I can't say much a.bout higher ranking, but I wquld ha;11e to s·ay this in 
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A: terms of, I've never known it, in terms of captains· and below, a,s· compa,ny 
comrnande:l'.'s in Viet Nam, I have never known that. Tn fact :r ca,n think eif an 
artillery officer who became ... who branch transferred as· an infantry· o{ficer 
and became a company commander and who was really bad. And our battalion 
commander relieved him and really in essence, ruined his career, and f>cth cf 
them were West Point officers. Now, I am sure there are situations in higheT 
ranking officers and so fo:1'.'th when that may, you may, it may take place. I 1d 
have to say this though; I don't want to get in the, of defend anybody, T1 d 
have to say this, you have to bounce off a certain amount of objectivity of 
people who make these sort of statements, because a lot of non-West Pointers·~ 
they feel it, and I think it's a type of sour grapes· is involved. Not a,lways-, 
you know, but a lot of it, is a type of sour grapes and when the facts· and 
evidence just does not support that allegation- . . One thing, r think it is· sheer 
numbers a lot of times, especially in high ranking officers who really make it, 
a,nd what happens often times that very few people understand, west Pointers· 
learn through their training the system and, therefore, they have come into tne · 
Army 25 points ahead of everybody else. See they understand the system , And 
when you understand any sort of bureaucracy, whether or not its the university 
or whatever, you are ahead of the game, if you understand how· it works. And 
they come in, once they graduate from West Point, they realize, · you know, what 
the game is. They understand what the rules are and play by them, a,s a rule . 
There have been some notable exceptions, but you see the OCS and ROTC officers·, 
they don't understand what the rules are, until many times it is too la,te. So 
you get a preponderance of West Point officers, I think, later on. Of the 
compa,ny comma,nders: :r would sa,y of the dozen or so that I knew in Viet Nam, I 1 d 
s-ay· ei<Jht of them were west Pointers. The most effective officer tha,t ]: t' '.e 
SIDE 2 
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A~ ever known in my life was ... the two most effective in Viet Nam were both 
of them West Pointers. One of them was the guy who finished ... no, no, one of 
them was· West Point and one was an OCS guy in Viet Nam; and one was· the· goat 
in his class, West Pointer, named Robby, that was what we called him. And he 
wa,s· just, •. he brought with him a type of street sens·e that very few people ever 
had, and he saved an awful lot of lives. Yet his company probably did more in 
terms of the war effort, I mean killing and whatever, you know·, really doin<J 
the job, than anybody else had: Delta company. Then we had another West Point 
officer, Jess .... (end of side 1) 
A: .... enlist~d. He was an older guy and he had a lot of savvy, too, and those 
are the two are the best young officers Itve ever seen. But I really think the 
objectivity oftentimes when people make these sort of statements· about West Point 
is not necessarily true. What I've heard former commanders of mine say about 
West Pointers, have basically said this; if you take an ROTC officer, OCS and 
a West Pointer and start them off as 2nd Lt.'s, the West Point officer is by 
and large the better officer. As they advance with experience through the ranks-, 
the OCS and ROTC will catch up and the majority of the time, now this is a 
non-West Pointer talking and I think there is a lot of truth in it and it has· 
b.een my experience, as they catch up, the ROTC-type in many cases will out-
distance them in terms of thinking and being able to ... in terms of leadership , 
C: Possibly. But how many division commanders do you know who were ROTC 
graduates-? 
A: Very few, you know, very few. Now, in the present day Army it's an awful 
l~t of people , . S..:j.~nglaub for instance is a non~West Pointer here 
~ 
who is· a 4-star general, commander of the largest forces- command; commander of 
the lar~e~t CQ.TIJIµ~nd tn the Arrt)y is a QCS graduate. And so yqu see, you do have 
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A: guys· like this. And of course you have got the others, like the 
Westmorelands, and Abrams and others who, of course, are west Point, you 
know·. But by and large, you know, you are right. By and large in sheer 
preponderance and numbers for one thing ... 
c~ And yet the OCS and ''Rotcies" are the ones with the sheer p:1?eponderance 
and numbers-, n0t the West Pointers. 
A: In Viet Nam that was true. It's not true now. 
C: What happened to them all? They didn't suddenly seek to return to 
civilian life .•. 
A~ 'A lot of them have been rifted (.sp???) out of the Army, primarily because 
of . • . a, lot of them ... well, it 1 s hard to say. A lot of them, I am sure, for 
incompetence. During the big Viet Nam buildup there was no doubt, I don •·t 
think there was any doubt in anybody's mind that a lot of guys· got through_ 
OCS who probably would not have gotten through otherwise. You know they 
commissioned guys who were smart guys through OCS who just had high school 
educations, and guys who didn't have the maturity. 'And, of course~ I' guess· 
CaTley, · (sp???) is an often-cited example about a guy who just really didn tt 
have it; who became a commissioned officer. Now, whether or not that~s 
true or not, I certainly- don '·t have any personal experience. But a lot of 
these guys have gotten rifted out because when, you see, promotion boards 
began to meet, take a look at records and the guys that donlt have a college 
degree and all, they are gone. Which I think in many cases is- unfair Many 
of these guys who performed very admirably in Viet Nam and did an excellent 
job . I think we have to face: that, that other guys· ha-ven•t got a fair sha,ke. 
Now, if y0u a~e ta,lking about the war effort in Viet Nam, I have to say· fro~ -
my own personal experience, I don't think the West Point Protecti'On Association · 
hurt us any, in Viet Na,m. ~nd of all the compa,ny co~anders and things that I 
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A: knew, you know, just didn't hurt us any at all. Now if yocr want to talk 
about the basic philos0phy of the Army overall and what's happened since then-... ~-
! -mean in lower ranks---now higher ranks, see, I can't have any experience,, , 
r· can only tell you 0n the ground what happened to us·. 
C: Yeah , I'll have to wait a couple of years until you are a general, • . 
A: Yeah ... no, on the ground I'll have to tell you basically what happened · 
to us·, yc,u know, and I can't ... I am sure we were affected by some of those 
decisions·, which we can get into, but ... And that's the interesting tfi.ing, you 
see. Part of the difficulty, I think, Cecil, with fighting a war is the 
realization that people are going to get killed and they are going to get-mafaned~ 
wounded, and whatever. ll.nd part of the decision in Viet Nam b.ec~e a situati0n 
of, are we going to do this operation or not and if we are not, or if we are 
~eally worried about doing this· operation, is it because we sta.nd a possib±lity 
of a lot of casualties? Now, when you go to that sort of operati~n, tfiat is- a 
hinderance right there. I mean if you are going out to kill or destroy tfie 
enemy to win a war, that has to be ... you don't consider that. I don~ t-mean 
y0:u b.e stupid and you don't run through a mine field, you know, just because. 
the enemy is out there, but you know, you do have t0 face that. And as tfie 
war w0re 0n, that became, you see, the latter part of my te>ur. , first part of · 
the tour our pe0ple got killed with small arms fire, mortars and thi_ngs· like 
that, I mean in direct confrontation with the enemy, The last three months·, 
our people began to be killed with booby traps and stuff like that, so all of 
a sudden that was the unseen enemy. 
C: 11.'Ja.s· that because of a change in the phasing of the war or ... what? 
A: In my particular unit, it was because we began to kill so many , And they 
just weren't available, and because of the particular mission of -my unit and 
because the NVA was still there and because a lot of the s-upply· lines fi.ad been 
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Ar cut off and everything and because we went through a three month period , 
in particular when we were in that free fire zone, where everybody was· killed 
±n there, so as they would come out and try to get food and other things, we•d 
close with them and there was a lot of killing . And it was a confrontation 
and they ran out of, you know, a lot of supplies and there was no way· you 
could get in there to them. A lot of them tried to escape through . the little 
canals to the sea and were caught, and so ... The last three months, because of 
a change of really tactics and because maybe they became better 0rganized · and 
p lus- the policies changed. For instance, the free fire zone was no -more, and 
so that way the more villagers began to come back in and see the Vietnamization 
policy· started. And so then 0f course, what happened is booby traps- and things· 
like that and so all of a sudden we were fighting an unseen enemy·, And when · 
a commander says, ok, or a battalion plans a.n operation, they say, 9k, we ha;ire 
got to move from point A to point B, and the battalion commander, ene sf tfie 
first things that he says is, boy, I tell you, we know that's an area where 
there has been a lot of booby traps set so we better not go fr0m A to point B., 
but we better go from A to point C and then to B.. And, of course, you see1{ 
that changes the whole concept right there. It reduced combat assaults and 
things like that because, you see, part of the decision made by higher head= 
quarters at this point had to do with a battalion commander's effectiveness 
oftentimes- was- based en how few people got killed. Remembe:i, at Leavenworth 
when, what was- that Spanish general came up there and when he was being intro~ 
duced, one of the remarks said about ... what was his name.? You know-, he was- a 
little short guy that spoke to us in the small bedroom. He was frc:~m ·Ft. Hood, .. 
and one of the remarks in his introduction, said one of the reasons- this guy 
was- a great commander was he had such and such battalion or brigade in Viet Nam 
and out of that time, they had almost nobody killed. Wait. What was- that 
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A: saying? How much action did they have, or you know·, where were they 
fighting? You know, if you are out there at a war effort with a battalion and 
y0u get n0oody killed, there• s - two or three questions tG ask:. · 'Maybe they a'.'e 
n0t doing anything. And so you see the policy ... a battalion commander~s-
effecti>veness- began to be toward the end of my tour is· how-many.,..--how· few-
people you get killed. You know, because the heat nega.n to get on people 
:from the States and either places. In the book '~Fr iendly- 'Firel' that guy got 
killed in the first part of •70, so you see the heat negan to 11'.'ea,lly get 
put on people and t0 reduce casualties and get tlie 'Vietnamese out tliere in 
front, you Rnow-, and do the eild Polish minesweepeil'.' bit. Tha,t s0:r::t of. stuff. 
And so that was· a part of the philosophy that changed that y0u could attribute 
to highell'.' command. Who made those decisions ? Well, r guess- the -military- -ma,cl.e 
those decisions, but it affects· ... or generals· somewhere ~ you know-, some sort 
0f policy-, but it begins· to affect. things·. 
C: D0n't you see a hlfercation in fault (.???) here that we have people like 
Westmoreland in '70 and Abrams later on still saying, yes, we can handle the 
situation over here, at the same time they are bowing to certain pressur es-
to reduce casual ties-, thus contact with the enemy is reduced while tney· are 
still p romising to sweep the enemy out of Viet Nam. 
A: Absolutely. Absolutely. You know, the philosophV 9~ven to the troops 
when I was· there in 1 69 and of 168, from I 1d say May, June of 1 68 o~, the 
philosophy gi-v.en to the troops· and the basic way an order came down was- a 
battalion commander along with the s-3 and others planned an operati~n. You 
know, we are going to have a sweep. A eompany is at point A; they are going 
t0--move to point Rand somewhere along the line beyond point R, Charlie, Company· 
wi·th three platoons or whatever forms- a blocking force, DeJ.ta Company- comna,ts-
assaults; you know, in other words, a battalion operation which involves- everybody 
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Ae on a particular spot where intelligence says the enemy is·, and so when 
a, s-....3 gives· tflat order for that operation through the company cmnrna,nder, 
,, 
and when the oatta,lion commander flies out with his· maps- and says-, ok, tfl±-s· 
is· what we are going to do. Here's what I wa,nt you to do. They didn '·t say-, 
hey, this· is· a better idea or what, but then he went back. to his men and s-aid, 
here's· ... and by and large company commanders would explain to the plato0n 
leaders. You know, here's the operation, explain it to your ·men. You know_. 
our mis·s·ion, close with, kill, destroy the enemy and net try to keep · from · 
getting killed yourself and that sort of stuff. But yo~ know how you do it. 
We a:r-e out here at war. This is the way you do it and by and large, gnys- were. 
,, 
doing it. r mean really- moving and guys· with a lot of v±gor and, you know·, 
extremely effective. Some of the most effective people I Ive ever seen, unt±-1 
we lost a lot of them by being killed, platoon sergeants·. Boy, I' rememb:ei1 
one guy, old Sgt. Monroe , an E-7 platoon sergeant ... black as the ace of spades-, 
but I mean, boy, he could in five minutes, he could have a platoon of ·-men 
just eating out of his hands. I mean he would have them out there, tfie h~ir 
rais€d on the back 0f their neck, boy, out there charging tfie enem±es·; you ·. · 
know-, kill a Commie for motherhood. I mean it's· just that simple. And guys-
were involved in it. And that was the basic philosophy·, you know·, as- we 
moved into '69, the philosophy changed. The company commander says-· to his· 
platoon leaders·, hey, we got to go to point B- and for goodness· Si3,kes-, wa,tcli 
out for booby traps, get your point man way out there, spread your people 
out. You know, the battalion commander says and I say to you, hey·, we bette,r · 
not ~et anyoody 1 s ass· shot off, you know, we don't want anybody killed. W.e 
don tt want any booby· traps·. 
C: What is the point of moving the troops-? 
A: Well, you see, you are still ... they are still trxin9 to operate, you know .. . 
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C: Operate for what end? 
A: ·usually to move to some point where there was suspected enemy· activity·, 
you know, by intelligence. For instance, battalion has· a S-2 and he has an 
intelligence section and he's got local informers, he's got Vietnamese inter-
preters-, we ~ve got Chew Hoys Csp???).. You kn0w a Chew Hoy·, a guy· who supposedly 
was a VC or something who has come over to our side, usually young kid or some-
thing, supposedly providing intelligence. Yeu know·, we seen, tfiere ~ s been -movement,. 
a,11 that sort of stuff. You must know a funnny story. 
C: No, I was just thinking . .. I wonder what rank he was in the North Vietnamese 
Army. 
A: Y'eah. Well , most of these guys were VC. They were, you know, and had some 
concept o f what's going on, sometimes some valuable information and sometimes 
it was just a total waste. Plus a lot of other things went on in terms of 
operation, typical sort of principles of war things, security, you know, a 
company connnander, boy, he's ... you know, that's the first thing he does. He 
secures his area before you do anything, he gets ... and of course, we ... he secures 
that area where he is. We walked a lot but we also flew a lot. I mean combat 
a.ssaulted usually, you know, into a particular place. And we always operated 
at night. You know, we had a lot of night operations. 
C: Let's talk about security for a minute. And this wouldn't involve you up 
along the coast near Hue particularly, but I suspect you were well aware of the 
stories in the Saigon area, in the larger occupied towns where we used in-
country indi-viduals to perform all tasks in military areas_, They swept the floors·, 
they go to the ammunition boxes, they shifted mortars around, they unloaded the 
airplanes·, they cut our hair, they measured us for clotliing, they· sold us supplies 1 
they ca.me in a,nd they cleaned up our hooches (.sp?). during the da,y·, and at night 
Side 2, Rec~rded , page 37---Jerry Autry ~--------
C: they directed rocket assaults on (i~~±gieae*~ Tan Son Mhut. 
A: Yeah. 
C: Wfiat kind of reactions do you have about that sort of thing? 
A: I' think,, first of all, it was stupid, you know, that all of us participated 
in it. r got out of the hospital or went to Bien Hoa for my· las-t month 
there and I was in the rear area and that's the first time, rea,lly, I had been 
introduced to it, but I think it was just absolute stupidity on our part because 
we realized what was going on, you know. There were an awful lot of the 
Vietnamese, I am sure, who, at least from their frame of reference were loyal 
and never did anything like that. But I am sure there were others· who just did 
that who didn't direct rocket attacks who did that sort of stuff. -It wa,s· jus-t 
another concept of stupidity on our part. 
C: An Air Force sergeant recalls at Tan Son Mhut seeing the loaders up on 
airplanes stepping off paces between the airplanes, counting so that they would 
be able to go home and draw a map locating their spots on the tarmac. 
A: we found stuff like that, you know, constantly. Of course, it wa.sn 1·t 
only confined to that particular area, but you see with. every company·, when the · 
-Vietnamese program started, the Vietnamization program started, Nixon I s Vietnami..--
zation program, or was it Johnson ... 
C: Nixon. 
A: See every company had to operate with a platoon of Vietnamese, usually 
the rough puffs (.???), you know, local types who were provincial force, pp•· s · 
and who spent a lot of their time chasing chickens and stuff like that. The 
Americans had absolutely no respect for them. A lot of it was our fault, It 
was- the cultural system which we were never able to breach. I got to the point 
where I had absolutely no interest in any Vietnamization or w±n friends and 
influence them for your ~~n:tNy, because from a cultur~l standpoint, they weren't 
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Ae good soldiers-. We would be out on operations, they'd be chasing 
chickens and ducks-. They were very cruel to their own people, you know, and 
:i:t wa.s- a lot of stuff running around in my head, like all GI'· s -, what a waste 
this is. They didn't. ... at least from a fighting s·tandpoint and from tfie 
American war effort in Viet Nam , they were ten times-much more of~ hindera,nce. 
C: Why would they be so bad a hundred miles· south of the DMZ? Yem wcmld 
put them ten -miles north. of the DMZ and they turned into fine soldier s, 
Ae Well, of course, that's something we don't know. we don't know- that 
they would turn into fine soldiers or whatever. A peasant is a peasant is- a 
peasant used to be a saying, you know. And, of course, maybe witfi. a, different 
philosophy of life with a cocked 45 at your head you may be a good soldie~. 
You know- the old Turkish_philosophy; there's no problem, you either do what 
we say, you know in the Army, you soldier or you die. You know maybe if you 
got that sort of philosophy, then maybe things are different , You know· -ma,ybe 
if the guy is ten miles north of the DMZ and that becomes tne philosophy it 
becomes- a different story, at least for awhile, until dying makes· no -more difference 
and then the guy dies. So it's hard to say. I don't know if I could neces-sa,r::i:ly, 
Cecil, accept that right off the top of my head. That doesn't mean all tfie 
Vietnamese weren I t good soldiers. We had the few DieWie (.Sp???). capta,ins-
that I thought were pretty good. 
C: That's a term I've not heard. 
A: DieWie (.sp?)_. That's Vietnamese for captain. Vietnamese ca,ptain. DieWie(:sp?L, 
But lot of it is- a cultural sort of thing, at least from our sta,ndpoint. See, 
we were attempting to judge Vietnamese from where we were. r can remember only 
one real fire fight where I thought the Vietnamese really performed well. It 
was- a, situation where they had to; where we just literally got our tails· kicked 
cross·ing a great big open space between four-sided woodlines and all of a sudden 
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A: just, must have got hit from all four sides or something. Just got our 
tails kicked 1 Initially ab.out five or six of our guys killed, our platoon 
leader, platoon sergeant and ... hut I tell you , the . • ,and of c~urse we lata 
down a field of fire and this Vietnamese platoon really did perform. Of 
cour-se, they had old weapons, BAR 1 s (.sp?) and stuff like that. Of course, 
later on they got 16's. But they really did perform. That indicates· t0 -me 
,, 
that maybe we didn't give them a chance. We didn't really give them a chance : 
It's very subjective on my part because it's like teaching so.rnetimes . It got 
to the point that ... training somebody, · it got to the point that it•·s mor e 
difficult to train, spend time, than to do it yourself . And plus when we got 
the, I think we entered into a survival sort of environment. When we got them 
we were in a survival sort of environment, not so much the old close wi'th ., kill 
and destroy the enemy. And so I think that was part of it. But once again 
it was a kind of a bungling sort o·f thing how we got them, you know·, All of 
a sudden one day we looked up without the GI's being trained or having any 
c0ncept, and here they are, you got a platoon of rough puffs (.sp???) you know·, 
that's going to be with you from now on. Well, here's a bunch of ~I 's th~t 1 s 
already suspicious, and you know all of a sudden they look around and her-e trrese 
guys are with them. They don't care for that, you know, and so that was part of 
it. I think you want to put some fault on the military; that's a stupid thing 
right there, no sort of training concepts, you know ... and from leadership 
directed from on high. Then you see a point you get into, and we face it 
always, I think, in any big bureaucratic system of the general saying, hey, 
how·t s this· -Vietnamization working? Oh, the battalion commander says-, oh, 
it I s fantastic. Well, you know, if he talks to "Snuffy'1 , well, Snuffy· would 
!t'eally tell him how it is, plus this, that and the other. Plus· most generals·, 
even when they ti'l,lk to the troops, they don't get the real story. You know GI 's, 
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A: they learn rules of the game pretty quickly, and ye>u tell the guy what 
he wants to hear so he will move on. You know don• t take up any time with him. 
And then if you have got a real grudge to bear, you lay it on him, but by and 
large -people know who 1 s got the grudges so the guy will never see the guy who 
has got the grudge. 
C: I 1ve sometimes seen generals moving through an area talking witfi Snuffys-, 
and they seem to be a little upset if a soldier actually tries to tell them 
something that he's not expecting to hear, and he tends· often to move on rather 
quickly, just all by himself without being directed by anybody else. 
A: Yeah, a lot depends on the general, that's true . You know the gener al, he 
probahly would rather hear what he wants to hear, as a rule . y·e>u know, the 
more :ram thinking about this thing, the more I 1m thinking that the p0ssio.ility 
fo r loss was just built into the whole concept of Viet Nam, you know, from the 
very beginning, and you know, maybe this is part of it. 
C: For instance, we started out very early with Sir Robert Thompson's 
concept of body counts. He was the British general in charge of the Malaysian 
campaigns· against the Chinese guerrillas. And a Chinese looks different from 
a Malay, and so Thompson on that narrow, thin Ma~a y: peninsula said, ok, we ha;ve 
to get the Chinese out of here. That's easy. Intelligence tells· us that there 
are about 5,000 of them hiding out down there inthe woods. Ok, let's count 
the bodies· as we get them and for every Chinese body that turns· up, we know· 
we have one less to contend with. And the Malays could get really e xcited 
about this becaus·e the Chinese were foreigners and were imposing on them in 
ways· of living and certain tactical situations that they didn't want to contend 
with. SG they cooperated with the British, and the British. counted bodies 
and pretty soon there were no more Chinese. The last few surrendered and were 
evacuated. And that's· beautiful. That really works. And we -get involved in a 
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C: problem in Viet Nam and we say, hey, let 1·s count bodies. Except that 
there is no way you can tell the difference between a VC and a perfectly 
pacified member of a hamlet. No way you can tell the VC from the North. 
-Vietnamese. They all look the same. So that~s a faulty ass.umpti_on ta, begin 
with. Another one: again Thompson in Malay started the concept 0f stragetic 
hamlets·. If our Malays, our little brown brothers, are being troubled by the 
Chinese, then let's move them into areas where we can defend them. And so 
the strategic hamlet is born, the fortified village concept. And that worked 
really well. It brought safety and security to the Malays. We get involved 
in Viet Nam and we say, let's start strategic hamlets. Let's -move these 
people out of these little dung-filled villages into areas where we can watch 
them, got the fences round to protect them. Except the Malays· had no roots· 
in the soil in the cultural sense that the Vietnamese did . Some Vietnamese, 
their families, their ancestors, had lived in a particular village spot for 
a thousand years , and their ancestors were buried there. The land actually 
had a soul, that was part of their living soul, and they felt revivified, 
they felt vitalized by continued living there. And so we move them out into 
an area where they have no relationship with the soil, and we say, these 
people aren't content even when we try to help them, they don~t appreciate it , 
Again it•· s· a faulty assumption. 
A: Yeah, boy, I 111 say. Well, yeah, that's exactly right. Fact the more I' 
think aoout it, the more just the realization, what an impossible sttuation 
from moment one. And that's why I still say, the more I think of it, taking 
the givens of being there fighting the war, only one possibility as. I see it, 
Cecil, is just to literally ... well, you know, taking over the country as I see 
it in some way or another. Of course, I don't know, gee whiz . I really don't 
know. 
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Ct Well,you said awhile ago you were going to talk about some of tne 
tactical s-ituations· that your own unit was involved in. 
A: Well, in terms of day to day operations tactics were, I think, pretty 
sound, battalion type tactics of planned operations of ferreting ('?) out tlie 
enemy. And we never went a day without a lot of significant contact, especially 
for the first several months, say from June through, oh about, until the 
mons-oon, about January, set in. I mean a lot of significant activities·. 
Especially at night. And did a lot of blocking force sort of stuff with 
a combat as·saul t, say, a couple of platoons, or maybe even a COlllpany, into 
a suspected area and move through it with a blocking force on the othe~ end , 
And going thr~ugh small fields and searching out tunnels, bunkers, that 
sort of stuff. A lot of significant activity, a lot of killing, really 
killing the enemy, and I mean in terms of, well, body count. Well, now-our 
battalion, as· I remember it to start with, body count wasn 1 t the .. • we had 
so much contact that that didn't seem to be a significant pa,rt of it, we 
did get a lot of visitors and all because our battalion was one of tne few· 
battalions that were ... you know, we were . really involved, constantly , and I 
IJ mean literally, just constantly going on, something going on. And, of c@nrs€ i 
we did a lot of combat assaulting. For instance, six or eight helicopters-
combat ass-ault into an area where suspected activity, and ha,d a lot of hot 
Lzts- (. ? } which means that we happened to hit it pretty closely. And we had 
twe or three real big operations. I can't remember the name of the . • . h~.d a 
little is.·land that was somewhat removed from our AO, but we took three 
companies and combat assaulted into that island and swept it, a,nd just 
completely surprised a bunch of NVA 1· s. Casual ties· of over .. • we killed ove1J;; 
300 in that operation. I remember seeing the bodies- stacked .up as- hign_ as· 
this· house, you knqw, NYA bqdies. I r,emember we had a bunch of flacks,.,a lot 
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A: of flack over it because later on we had a bunch. of visitors· coming 
down wanting to get, you know, all kind of higher ranking -v±s·itors· getting 
a lot of souvenirs, a lot of weapons and stuff like that. Captured . ~l(47"s·C?J. 
you couldn't keep those but you could keep those s ... what they call a SKS, 
Chinese rifle .•. 
C: Why couldn't you keep the AK ... 
A: .•. automatic weapon, semi-automatic. It was· a good weapon. Big banana 
clip. But you couldn't bring those back to the States, but these SKS!s you 
could keep, and a lot of people were out for war trophies. Plus in a war 
sort of situation, and this was one of the funny things about it, you could 
use SKS's for trading material, and this was one of the interesting things 
about Viet Nam. It was always a certain amount of scrounging, I~m sure goes· 
on in any war, but, for instance, the Navy had a lot of material that we 
couldn't get our hands on up where:! we were. For instance, plywood. We jus-t 
couldn't get our hands on plywood. Now, well, say what would you want plywooa 
for? Well, if you are at a fire support base, you are going to be there a gooa 
while. You try to make it as nice as you can. You build semi-permanent sort 
of things, you know, instead of all tents, and plywood enables you to do that, 
GI's, especially rear area troops, support troops, they had a lot of ingenuity, 
and so we couldn't get plywood. Well, we could take a half a dozen or so SKS~s-
down to ... we'd send a couple or three guys down to Phu Bai or down to Quinyan (sp?;'?) 
or someplace like that and, boy, we'd come back with a truck or two, come back 
with all kind of plywood. And it was a pretty nice thing. And so ... in fact, 
battalions like ours lived a lot better in some ways, the fighting, especially 
the 'l'.'ea,r areas, and see, b.eca.use you had a concept, yo.u had the fire support 
base here, and then you had the troops operating out here in the AO , For instance,. 
I 
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1\t I'd built a little R & R, a little house for the troops because, see, 
the companies· would come back in every once in awhile to the fire support 
base and of course, all of them occasionally would come through when they 
would be going on R & Rand things like that. So I had a little reading room 
there and had a little music playing for them, and built it out of some 
plywood, you know. And troops really ... it was a place where they could go 
and write letters, and I always kept a lot of writing material in there and 
at night, the blackout situation, I had a little blackout lamp where they 
could come in there and write, so it was a pretty good thing. Well, how· dm 
you get stuff like that? Well, you use ... you trade for it. And you know--, 
you can requisition it, but you'd be DO '.s (?) before the requisition gets 
in. Of course, that's part of the problem with the whole supply system. 
You know, once again, a lot of the ... the people who lived easy in Viet Nam 
was people around Saigon and big areas like that; some of those people lived 
in hotels and all that sort of thing and, of course, but, part of it was the 
whole culture of the country, I guess, I mean the way we chose te fight it, 
which I look at now as we are talking: how stupid that was. I mean, tha.t was· 
literally stupid. But after awhile, war got to be kind of a routine thing. 
I -mean, really it did . You know, it's like a job. It got to be routine with 
operations· and planning and it was kind of a constant thing. And so when you 
talk about tactics.- , I think our battalion we observed pretty good tactical 
rules and fought according to the doctrine, and did it quite successfully, 
you know, although we took a lot of casualties, still especially in the early, 
first several months, we took a lot of casualties . And I did the typical 
chaplain type of things. I had services and served communion and h~d some 
ha.i--:ry expe'.l'.? iences·, you kn0w, serving communion . I remember once we were 
out.,,I wa.s· out serving communion to a bunch of guys and, b0y , we got pinned 
Side 2, Recorded , page 45~--Jerry Autry - --------
A: down for about three hours. They kind of had us trapped in there. 
And they kind of sneaked up on us because a lot of the guys were coming to 
Church, and r- had to b.e careful after that; too many of us· ounched up . Plus, 
every couple of months, I would have a memorial service , A lot of times we 
would do it at the fire support base and have it for companies-, and companies: 
that had lost a lot of people, they would come back in and have a -memorial 
service and whip back on out. Of course, guys are terribly religious, ycm 
know. Call it foxhole religion or whatever, the guys really .. • at lea.st 
where a lot of things· are going on, they were really pretty straight during 
that ti-me. But war became something that you just do and, of course, that's 
only a little segment of it, and as you try to look at the big picture, we 
were just such a little segment of it, and that's the thing that comes· throagh 
pretty clear right now. For instance, what makes it ... now, I'm talking about 
wha.t makes it so impossible. Here, for instance, you have got our battalion 
operating out there in the ... really, operating with a lot going on and our 
sister battalion, the second of the 5 0 1st (?) ... you know what the:j:r job 
wa,s·? Secure bridges along QL551 and the main highway down t0 .•• fr~m Hue to 
Phu Bai, and that's all it is: to secure bridges. 
C: During the day? 
A: During the day and night too. That's all they ever did. They didn~t 
operate out, but that's· a pretty big job, to keep them from blowing up the 
bridges-. You know they put security out. Well, that's all they did was· 
secure those bridges. You know, that was their thing. Let me get us· some 
more coffee. 
PAUS-E I"N TAPE 
A: Really, as I see it from a strate9ic standpoint, the more we talk a.00ut 
it 
I 
it i _s p.hsqlutely :i-I9,PQSsib.le the wa,y we were fighting- the war , I mean I r-
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Ae could go into the city of Hue, which I did oftentimes but not into Kue 
per se, but r•d be going from Hue to Sally, which was 0ur.,.Sally brigades· a 
base camp, and our battalion had a base camp there, and I'd go ab0ut once a 
week for a half a day and a night, and kind of minister to the rear troops·, 
have a service or whatever there. They had a little chapel there. But I 
would always· st0p 0ff in Hue 1 and in Hue you could do all sort of things, get 
your picture taken, you could visit around , they had a lot of shops, step off 
at a restaurant. I used to spend a lot of time with the ..• the Catholic Relief 
Society had a house there and I stopped in there and played a little Ra.po ( ? ??) 
with the Nuns. I'd fool with them a little bit, I mean fr0m a verbal standpoint, 
I 
and had a couple of gals that I really did like and liked me and, in fa.ct, they 
had an old beat up roadster or something like that. rt was a wagoneer and 
they couldn't keep it running and so I had our warrant officer, he'd cQme 
in there and constantly the rootor ·officer came in there to fix that thing; 
constantly and scrounge for parts . And finally they wanted a new vehicle 
and I got ... I put out word, hey, want to buy the nuns a vehicle, and the GI's· 
didn•t have anything to do with their money, so we raised 2 or 3 thems-and 
dollars· in a couple of weeks and gave it to them. I stopped off and ha,d a. 
little Tia Maria with them every once in awhile ... well, it wasn't every once 
in a,while ..• it was on a weekly basis at least. They'd feed me, Well, see 
you 'd have this sort of environment where you!d go to the shops and tha,t sort 
of stuff :by the daytime, and who knows who the enemy is all through there. 
I don•t. And, of course, Hue was where a big battle was fough.t,. , 1 68, 
February' 68, Tet, Tet offensive. And that's when I think probably we 
won the war, right there, if we'd pursued it, you know, a,t tha,t ti'me , And 
ma,ybe even let the South Vietnamese invade the north1 and maybe us done rt 
ourselves. r don't know. But that was the time to do it , Then see, I 1d -go 
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A: on over to Sally and be involved around there, and of course, y@U g0 
in Sally and there's all kind of shops right outside the gate, you know, a 
place to get your shoes shined, a laundry, you know-, that s0rt of · stuff , See 
my battalion was, especially when we were operating out at the fire support 
base, Sandy, wouldn 1't have any of that, because we were ont there where nooody 
was-, we didn it have any Vietnamese; absolutely none except a couple of 
interpreters·, those that were with the companies and all, so that was a 
different story. But it was an impossible situation, strategically, a.nd 
no way, you know, no way we could do any good continuing on 1 i:ke · that . And 
as r look at it now, I can't imagine, from my standpoint, what in the world 
military leaders were thinking about. I mean, it was an impossible s-itnatt~n 
from moment one . The only possible thing I see that we thought we c:Quld 
out-last them, which we must have been stupid to even have that concept 
to think that we could out-last them. No way. 
C: Well, it's hard to out-last them when we have to ship our people s ~aoa 
miles to get there, and they just have to step out their d0or. 
A: Yeah, that's right. The idea about out-lasting them though. is just 
unreal. How in the world can you out-last people who have been doin9 th~t 
all their lives, at least for years and years and years; from the French right 
on. I think it was just impossible, impossible situation. But r remember a 
Vietnamese college professor telling me that. I went down to perform a 
wedding for one of our captains who married this college professorts daughter. 
He had heen a general's aide down in Ban Me Thuot And the poor guy, 
he had to ex tend in Viet Nam finally to get all his pa_perwork taken care 0f 
to marry this gal, because, boy, I tell you, you talking abemt Americans-
culturally- making it impossible for Americans to marry Vietna;mese Now· on 
a bpo.gg scale, with ~11 the troops we had in Viet Nam, it was basically 
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A: -relatively few- marriages. They made it impossible, This guy- wa.s· ab.le 
to get it d0ne. But I remember this university professor telling me, and we 
got talking aoout it, and he spoke fluent English. He really considered himself 
a Frenchman, and that we would never be able to, Americans would never be 
able te out-last them. I remember him saying that. This was about early 1·69 . 
But when you are in that situation, Cecil, there is no way to be able to 
realize that, you know, only hindsight. 
C: Yeah, and I can see that, from an officer 1'Snuffy". , .yo11 w.ere what, a 
c3ptain when you got there? 
A: Captain the whole time, yeah. 
C: You know you are caught up in the heat of it, and you are involved with. 
the da.y-by..-day activities. But how about the planning staffs? 
A: They ought to have been able to. 
C: How about the Pentagon? 
A: Well , they ought to have been able to see that , The.:;- ought to have been 
able to see that, you know, and the more I see it, the more the high level 
decisions ... gee whiz. 
C: You suggest, I think rightfully so, that one wa.y to have won wc;,uld ha;we 
been simply to take over the country and run it as an American show., and yet, 
to have done that w<;>uld have been to have gone counter to the reason we were 
there; that is, to help the South Vietnamese to establish their own government 
and to prevent infiltration from the north. 
A: Yeah . Yeah, absolutely, you know, so therefore, what happened we got 
into nothing more than a holding pattern . 
C: Uhn huhn. 
A: Maybe the guys-~ philosophy was,. ,what was the guys, philosQ_E)he~ who said~ 
select a few strategic spots a.nd hold them. I have forgotten the_. guy· •. ,. this-
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A: was· one of the retired generals, said that's what we should be, •• 
enclave the0ry, •. 
C: Tne whole enclave idea. 
A; Yeah. And maybe that was the way to go, and if we'd set our mind to 
do that, say we were going to reduce downto this particular level and this-
is what we are going to do, maybe so. But the idea of "more is· better", 
conducting operations, getting our people killed, just like the story tha.t 
came out in "Friendly Fire", that just won't hack it. So An}ericans get more 
and more turned off and so forth. At one time I thought., . now· hindsight I 
thought it a lot a more, we were really making progress, was when Johnson was, ,. 
we were vigorously bombing the north, when Johnson was there. And because of 
the war protests and things when he really began to kind of lose his guts, you 
know-, about doing it. But activity ... that's when we were really fighting, 
I think, and you know, we weren't having a lot of booby traps and stuff like 
that, because the North Vietnamese, a lot of them, they were occupied, you 
know, when the bombing was going on and a lot of that. So .. ,but, boy, I tell 
you, it just appears to me to be just an absolutely impossible situation and 
the more and more as I see it, you know. 
C: Well, tactically, I think, units, small and large units, would go out on, 
oh, sweep and clear or search and destroy missions and they would have hard in (?) 
tell that a particular Viet Cong or NVA unit was in a particular region, and so 
out would go the American force, hammer and anvil or whatever tactic was adopted 
to make contact with the enemy, and then get to the designated zone and he 
wasn't there, and our unit would move back and forth, try to find him, finally 
call in the helicopters and evacuate them out and they ~d try again , They ~d get 
seme -more hard intell (. ? )_. Shadowboxing almost , And I wonder in relationship 
to the war principle of security, how well we w.ere ;,,wh~t w~s happening when 
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C: the generals· were discussing most plans; was there a hooch. (?) maid 
making up their beds·; you know there is no end to that really. But someplace 
or other, security was compromised. 
A: Well, of course, that may have been a theory and it was probably a 
strong possibility. I don't know, Cecil, though that if • • , on small unit 
operations like that necessarily was a ... 
C: (Unintelligible) 
A: A commander had to do that, because as I remember, and ot c0nr se, I 
cemld be entirely wrong, but I don't remember a lot of basic, wha,t we a 
generally concern doctrine, coming down from on top. 
C: Well, the doctrine was already there, I think. I mean , . as r unde7;stand 
it, from my tour at Leavenworth, whatever policy you had been told t0 adhere 
to, policy is a synonym for doctrine at that time. So you see, it was doctrine; 
body counts· were doctrines; clear ·and hold was doctrine; search and destroy 
was· doctr ine, backed up b.y the principles that we didn 1 t really have to tfiink 
abemt because they had been true since Sun Tzu, the various P't'inciples· of the 
war, of mobility, of manuever, of mass, of objective, of security, of simplictty, 
annihilation of ... and any doctrine must adhere to the principles· or else it's 
bad policy, it's false doctrine. Now, that's my understanding, of my tactical 
studies there at Leavenworth. 
A. : Yeah, but what I'm saying is that, one of the things I rememb.er now· ab0ut, 
for instance, we combat assaulted i11to an area and it was a cold LZ(.?l; r can 
remember ver y few times being stricked (.? ) out of there. 
C: What happened to you then? 
A: Well, we would stay, and invariably , we'd get into something . Invariably 
we would get into something . Of course, I don't know if that would be true 
all over Viet Naill beca,use, see , that's the thing about it; the~e w.e1;e a, r ea,s- of 
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A: -Viet Nam where nothing was going on. For instance, I talked to buddies 
of mine who were down in the First Infantry Division down around ., .what•s the 
name of that place ... Play Koo (sp???) ... and I mean they hadn•t seen action , . , 
they were there six months and never heard a shot fired in anger . T mean, 
really. That was· just unreal. And certain places in the highlands·, I mean, 
nothing going on, I mean literally nothing. For months. Guys- were doing the 
same sort of stuff over and over and over again. Nothing going on. You know, 
you are talking about 20,000 troops, you know in a division, First Infantry 
Division. And a:cound Play Koo (sp? ) ... brigades, you know, what in the world 
was going on. And we had a battalion down at, we had a battalion that 
belonged to the first brigade, they were down at ... down south, the only 
battalion we had down south, somewhere around the R & R Center. They would 
go for months and months and nothing would happen; no casualties; nothing. 
And we were having 5, 10, 15, 20 a day. So ... 
C: You spoke of going into a cold LZ(?l and then not being e x tracted but 
stay-ing in the area. When you made contact, was it a forced contact with 
anybody available or ... what I am trying to suggest: did you find and make 
your own enemy or were you always certain that those were actually VC or NVA 
elements you were in contact with? 
A: Well, of course, when we were in a free fire zone, anybody there was the 
enemy ... anybody. One time, I remember, we moved into an area and I happened 
to be with them, I was with them and we were in the area within a, oh, two 
or three click area, and one day about three o'clock, a squad killed two 
women. And when they were examining the bodies they found weapons· and all 
on the women, so they knew they were onto something, plus they found some 
:medical kits in bags. So they brought the S-2 out and they· brought an interpreter 
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A: out and this guy said, well, the ... we got really suspicious because 
this guy began to kind of clam up, the Chew Hoy (sp???), becahlse apparently 
he recognized something. As it turned out, we were right on top of a big 
NV hospital. We took something like 40 prisoners, patients. Killed about 
20 people, and lost none of our own people that particular time. Just 
absolutely sitting right on top of them. They were dug in really underneath 
a little field and these guys just happened to kill these nurses who were 
coming out 0f it, trying to make their way out to the ... to get some supplies· 
or something. They killed these nurses. So how we got in there is, I don't 
remember. I mean they had the hard information that there was something going 
on in that area; I don't remember. But now that happened to us a lot. For 
instance, we combat assaulted into ... next to a little old ... and made our way 
through it throwing grenades in things and, you know, typical kind of World 
War II style, kicking open doors, throwing grenades in . And one of tfie 
Vietnamese noticed that there were some ... he saw some peppers drying inside 
a little door and he knew that that meant, you know, somebody was around 
somewhere. And, boy, we found a bunch of tunnels, took about 40 prisoners, 
killed a bunch of people, and it was really something, you know. Of course, 
they brought in about two more companies because they were there. But I 'd 
say our battalion was the exception, see, of things that went on like that. 
C: A few years earlier there was a thing called the Geneva Convention, and 
I •·m not even sure that the United States is actually a signatory to the Geneva 
Convention on the rules of warfare. But it's my impression that we actually 
are not a s~gnatory. But one of the rules was that combat units were actually 
to avoid disturbing hospital areas ... 
A: Yeah. 
C: Non-combatants were to be considered non-combatants, privileged personnel, 
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C: r think is· the term used ... you and I are privileged pers0nnel . And I 
think of the so-called atrocities that came out of Wbrld War rr- where a 
German unit would encounter a Hausfrau(?or the Luftwafte bombs it, or Panzer 
units run across it, and the world is shocked. How do you meld that into tfie 
story you were just relating about your battalion finding a hospital and killing 
two or the nurses and 20. of the personnel were involved in working around the 
hospital. Reflect on that if you would. 
A: Well, of course, you know in a war situation, first of all in Viet Nam 
would be different ... the guys didn't know they were nurses. They say, oh, 
everybody is the enemy proposition. Of course, the concept of a free fire 
zone wa,s· • •. this became a military doctrine which meant just literally that; 
that anybody in there was enemy, and ... 
C: But what if I am in there and I don't know that somebody, some battalion 
commander some place has declared -this a free fire zone. 
A: Well, that would never happen. The Corp would have to declare tha,t, , . 
C: No, I am a Vietnamese. 
A: Yeah. 
C: ... and I'm a perfectly innocent Vietnamese civilian plowing behind my 
water buffalo. 
A: Well, you wouldn't be there because you would be moved out. That was 
part of the supp0sed doctrine behind the free fire zone would be that it"s 
j 
announced previously with the, you know, AO at the Corp level, and all Americans, 
Vietnamese, the civilians would be extracted out of there. They would be ma,de 
to -move I'n f?J,ct it was a, long time when everything west of •. , no, ea.st of a 
certain line on the city of Hue became a free fire zone, but up tq about one 
to three along the coast, a,nd they were supposed to go in, extra.ct everybody, out, 
and then everybody would (illigible). 
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C: How can you be sure you have extracted everybody:? 
A: Well, you never can, You know, there is no way you can do that, 
C: You take somebody out and they have left tfiei:r:: bao.y- back in the 
village and so they go back to find their baby. 
·A: Dea,a, you know·, it's· dead. Plus, you see, you are talki_ng a,b6nt not .' onlyc 
ground troops·, you are talking about artillery .... 
C: Yeah, oh, yeah. 
I! 
A; You're talking about Navy preps· C?? ?) from the , · not ho1;,pital ship ,, fa1t the · 
battleship New· Jersey· firced off the coast; big 80- inche:rn-. And you are talking 
about B-52 bombing strikes. You are talking about all sort of, well, of cou~se ~· 
ycmr own stuff, 105's, 155's and so, you know, the possibilities- are really 
great. r don 1t think though, Cecil, really that ... I don 1t think ... it~s- h~rd to ' 
equate a situation where you have got a fixed front line and a hospital area · 
or something where you got people caring for their own people who ha,ve been · 
wounded and all a,nd their situation where they are trapped , I don~t mean to 
justify it, because how in the world can you ever do that. But, you .know, you · 
jus~, in a wartime, you just kill what's there. That's part o f the whole o~ll 
of wa:x. You know, they are chaplains, doctors, whoever like -me, they are j us,t 
dead if they are in there and boy there's no ... and I, .. and that's the difficult · 
part of it, you know . . . and that's· what -makes· the situa,tion like Calley· so 
difficult, beca,use although he wasn't in a free fire zone, it could have 
previously· been one , He and his people could have been opera,ti_ng froll) '.that 
C<!>ncept, and had that really implanted in their brain; hey, this- is somebody . •• 
these people are on somebody's- side and we don't think they are on our s, ?o 
therefore, babies and everything else became fair game, which. is- awful , 
C: Yes·, it really is- an awful concept . 
A: It really is. It's awful. It's terrible, and yet it's unfortunately 
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A: understandable; to me it is. And that's why I think it is- almost 
impossible until a guy has kind of been there in that sort of environment , 
You know·, the other side of the coin is to think that , .. what ·makes- ·me now-
feel so badly about the whole thing, the whole Viet Nam picture, is· to think 
ab.out all the young kid s and GI's that were exposed to that sort of thing, 
needless·ly, with no possibility of being able to wi n, or having to face 
something like that where your whole morals and everything else will be in 
question. 
C: Yeah, that makes a very severe danger. You, at least, had a pa,rticula,r 
kind of back ground and preparation. 
A: Yeah. 
C: You were a cultured man when you went out there. 
1\: Yeah .. 
C: And you can ref lect upon any of these exper iences and somehow- or other 
absorb them ... 
A: Yeah. 
C: ... regret some, enjoy others, repent of some , .. Thi_s · fellow T ha,ye ta,lkea · 
to who was· a -member of Operation Phoenix, he was 19 years· old when he got ther e, 
and he was a good boy scout. He could crawl through grass without being seen 
and so he was told, that guy's got to be assassinated. Five years later here 
in the States working in a gas station, he's as full of guilt as anybody· I've 
seen for a long time, and he will carry that with him with a long, long time, 
and you know·, he's:., ... 
S±de 1 , R,e.corded August 1977 , page 1, Jerry Autry 
A: ... to me that really is the sad thing about of the whole pr-oces-s· when 
you begin to think about V'A< hospitals be all filled up with. these kids. I 
know I' did a quarter or two of clinical education up at VA Hospital up at 
Brooklyn and talked to a lot of these kids ... 
C: Was this going through your career course? 
A: Yeah, it was·, and it was really kind of sad, you know-, to realize wha.t 
had happened. Of course, they didn't realize the guilt problems, you know, 
they jus-t knew something was wrong. And I think that I s- the reason fer many· 
cas·es-, a lot of them wound up in the psychic ... 
C: Uhn, huhn 
A: ••• and, you know, it 1 s really something. When you think of, you know-, 
approximately 
50 thous-and killed/ and no telling how many wounded and especially a lot of 
<JUYS- in the latter part, vulnerable part, would, you know-- ooooy: traps- and 
things· like that, gee whiz . .. And, of course, that works on all the: guys-
that wounded but the guys who see -it, and that causes a sor-t of a different 
environment, and of course, what happened, a lot of guys- who in World War II 
and even Korea would have been killed, were saved. I mean, we could h~e a 
guy blown apart and 5 or 10 minutes later he would be in a surgical ward at 
Phu Bai at the 130th General Hospital or something and so, you know·, 
you get a situation like that, it was really something. I rememoer we ha,d a 
operation and I happened to be with this unit, a platoon and we got tw~ guys-
killed one day at lunch, just freaky sort of thing. These two guys· were 
") 
sitting around on the side of a house eating lunch and a, NVA· sold:i::.ew popped 
his- hea,d up out of a hole and killed both. of them right t fie~e~ And, of 
course, we didn't find out until much later, you know·, we got what had 
happened, but nobody else saw· it or anything. Couldn 1·t find anything. Of 
course, it puts- guys· into · a panic because they've been · there long eno_u~h to 
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A: know, well, gee whiz, what in this world is going on? And so, you talk 
about wha,t a hassle, and this has an effect ... r happened to oe there, you 
kn0w, and I' t!t'ied to calm these guys-, these guys- just scared to deatn , · r -mea,n 
just literally just scared to ... this whole platoon ... we had to eventually-, 
the platoon leader, just morbid, you know, with fear, and we had to extract 
this whole plato0n. You know, just send them down to Cocoa Beach for a 
day or two of, you know, Rand R. And it was, gee whiz, it was· some bad 
scenes. And of course this has to have an effect upon guys, you know, the'.l'.'e 
i:s jus-t no way around it. rt has to have an effect on them And it does. 
And you know, when you get back to the States you try- to as-s-imilate i:t; can it 
do it, rtis- tough. And of course, you know there was some funny, numQrous-
things- that would happen and I got out .•. my modus operandi was usually out 
of a company. I would have about a half a dozen or so guys- I really g-ot · 
cl0se to, you know, and of course, typical GI fashion, a lot of tnem would 
share all kinds· of stories· When they would go on Rand R they would tell 
a,oout the whores, prostitutes· they encounter •.. of course, a. lot of it was, 
probably lies-, you know-, but they still ma,de up some interes-ting s·torj:es-1 
And you know a lot of guys would share with -me the intricacies· of some, of · 
their home life, you know, the problems that would happen while they we:r;,e 
people; 
gone, w-±fe would run off, shacked up with other/ guys wno wauld try· to get 
emergency leave and anything to get out of there; guys who occasionally were 
refusing to fight, you know, was going to get out of the- field at all costs, 
stuff like that; coming up with_ all sort of reasons·, all sqrt of things- tfl:a,t 
happened. You know, as· I look back on it now·, the thing r tnink i:1,bout · is 
the strong feelings- of isolation a lot of guys· had a.bout, especially a,fte,r a, 
while, you know, really being isolated from family and everything else. They 
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A: were alone and this and that and the other and ..• but it would amaze you, 
guys you would run across who would extend, or guys who were over there for 
second or third times. 
( 
C: PD4s'and PFCs? 
A: Yeah-, a lot of time ... who especially would extend. And I convinced our 
battalion corranander once to rotate the good looking guys who had extended 
because some guys had such short range goals who realized that if they could 
extend, they- could get a leave or something to go home. Anything t0 get out 
for awhile; so guys· who really shouldn't be there. And occasionally you wo.uld 
't"tln on a guy who loved it. I think of a lieutenant, a young lieutenant, tnat 
I ran onto. OCS gradudte, I can't remember his name; I've got it floating 
/\round somewhere, who was working on his fourth. year. ~ -11, he ha,d a couple 
of years as an enlisted man and gone back as a OCS ... and come. oa.ck as a 
lieutenant. A bachelor, making a],.l this money; he loved it, you know. He 
really loved it. And he loved the informality of it . Stayed in the ~ield 
all the time as- a platoon leader and he had been the gamut, you know·, He•d 
been a re .... c0m (.? ). platoon leader, which. is a real hot shot; a guy· wfi~ loved~ .• 
who really and he left that and went to companies and then he weuld go 
into s·taff for a couple of -months, and then some guy would get killed or 
something, and he would be back out there. He loved it, And he never wore ~ny- ra,nk, 
beca,11se they always· d'l'.'opped in the clothes, clean clothes·, eve'l:;y· couple of 
days·. The guys would just send in their old stuff and put on what they sent 
out, you know, fatigues and all, He just loved that sort of environment, 
you know, he really loved it. And some interesting, interes,ting, s-trange 
characters out there. 
C: Well, I have heard from several of the people r- ha,ve visited that they· 
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C: didn•t appreciate chaplains too much while they were over there, that 
the chaplains . • . they would see a chaplain that they had never · seen · oefere, 
would come out and hold a memorial service for the tro0ps he didn~t know--
or didn't care anything about, and then he would disappear until tfre next 
time they were assembled in company formation for another memorial se~vice, · 
Though, T suspect that is a biased view. Would you reflect on the role of 
chaplains in Viet Nam? 
A: Well. .. 
C: Given the fact that someplace I have a book on the same subject by, . 
who was it, one of our fellows at chaplain scnool, otconner.,. 
A: Yeah. 
C: He has: written a book called The Role of · Chp,pl~ins-· in--·"-Vi'e't>'N-a,m / 
A: Yeah. Well, I think. that is true in a lot of cases,, but r think t:t is 
justifiable critic ism. I don't think it is always true. You fmow, you · lia;ve 
to look at the individual guy and I would say that from my standpoint, 
probably my battalion ccmmander probably C(:)nsidered me, especia,lly· eme., 
cons·±dered -me probably his most valuab],.e asset. The first one I' ha,d dNn ~t 
like chaplains·, didn't see any use for them, and te>ld me so and S-<'!l -my-modus" 
operandi with him was· just, really through the advice of the s·-3 who was 
the guy wh0 was just the opposite, said hey just ignc,re this· guy, go out a,nd 
d0 your job and you know, it will be ok. And thatts exactly w.hat I' did, and 
by the end c,f the time when this battalion commander left, you know, he a,nd 
T had a decent relationship , B.ut he was a very vicic,us· man and ki·lled 1 :r am _,. 
probably 
sure; a lot of innocents-, if there was such a thing, and I don ~t think had a, lot 
of care and concern for anybody and liked to collect hero medals· and stuff like 
that. The second one Thad, that was a guy who relied on my experience and who 
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A: felt like he could always, said to me, the reason he asked . me a lot of 
questi(!)ns·, he felt like he could get some objective data from me tha,t fie 
needed, you know. And he relied on me. Of course, part of the difficulty 
in this case was I was the strong guy and he was kind of weak in some wa.y-s, 
a,nd I had to be ve.ry careful. Of course, we had a strong S.-3 who · knew., . 
who had been there a long time and who knew the situation and could really 
hang right in there with him, and so that worked out ok. But you know, what 
I tried to do was· to keep a good handle on what was going on, plus a lot ~f 
individual ministery, you know, and my ministery of presence is what I would 
ca.11 it-more than anything else is what was really probably more valuable 
than anything els·e. I was out there. I became a little over involved. I 
-mean, whatever that means, whatever over involvement is in that sort of 
situation. And I was kind of independent. I never went t0 chaplains tmeetings-, 
I never, you know·, the things where you c0uld get away and I never went to those 
things·. I lived a very strong, celibate life. I worked 20 hours· a day, it 
was a period of a lot of personal growth in my own life, and really I could, 
really let my workaholic side just go without any, you know, without any out-
side encumbrances or anything, and I just worked all the time and ha,d sometnin~ 
going all the time and was always out moving. And of course what happened, 
you see, is tha,t people see that. They see that and it doesn't take you --very-
lcmg to establish yourself, and when I came to a platoon or a company·, well, I 
was a welcome friend, you know. I was somebody different, you know·, and what 
do you need, how long can you stay with us. When a co_Il)pany didn't see me fol;' 
a,whi:le, the company commander would call a.nd say, where's the chapla;tn? we 
ha,ven 1·t seen him 0ut here in a few· days . Send the chaplain out, or. • and 
Christmas and Thanksgiving, special occasions, I got my own helicopter; could 
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A: have had one at my disposal all the time if I wanted. Most of the. time 
I flew the log birds things like tha.t tha,t were j.ust going to 
different places·, but I would go out and vis·it around. You kne>w·, I' wrote 
letters to families, not only the killed, people having specia,l problems·, 
you kn0w, I wr<:>te to organizations that were sending us stuff, you know-, 
I wa,s recipient of a lot of goodies that I passed out to the troops, you 
know·, that they couldn't get from other places. Did all sort of things·, 
a,nd boy I tell you ! ... fruitful, fruitful year, and there was a lot ot persona,l 
growth because, having experienced a combat situation and shedding your own 
blood, so to speak; I' sound a little vicarious here, but I mean just ..• it was 
involvement, just total involvement, and I think probably was highly appreciated, 
just highly appreciated, and like I told you ... we talked aoout the medals yes-ter~ 
day·, that was evidence of it. Not so much that you are a hero, but just, hey, 
this guy is· out here when he doesn't have to be so he deserves· what we can do 
;for him. Plus being able to say to the commanders, you know, saying, not only· 
do I' think this guy should come out of the field, but saying, hey, let•s take 
this guy to the field, and he'd say, roger, you know, no questions· asked 
One time I had an NCO who came to me and told me, said, hey, I'm cracking up, 
he satd I' can't last. This is it. A guy who had been o.ut there for 10 or 11 
-months, I've got to get out, you know, I'm at the breaking point And - I 
tried to talk to him a little bit, and I went back in and sa,w the ba,tta,li_on 
., 
c0mmander, and r said, better pull this guy out. No questions· asked He 
called and said, send Sgt, so and so in, I'm going t<:> -make him -my security 
officer here at the fire support base. No questions: asked, you know-, no, 
·' why? or n0thing. And y~u know that's ... it really does a lot for the eg<:> 
On a perscmal basis it creates problems for you because, see, when y0u come 
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A: hack home to an environment, that's part of the military· prcblem, 
you can be the greatest thing since pockets one place, but you g~ to another 
place, you have got to establish yourself all over. You don•t have any 
credentials·; you know, yo1,1 just show right up there. And so that's what 
.• , so you have got some readjustment along that line , But I: w0uld say 
frc,m the basic question, 
that/ .. there was justifiable criticism. That wasn't true in my case, I 
don•t think, it wasn't true in a lot I knew. A guy that was in my sister battali_on 
~x~illl,he got his foot blown off. He was out there with the. troops •.• 
C: Guarding a bridge. 
A: W~ll, yeah, yeah, he was out there somewhere with. them and • •• of cour s€, 
that doesn't mean, you see, that guys who were back in rear areas and things 
like that, they wanted to do anything either, because those people have got 
to have chaplains too. And so it's all kind of luck of the draw. There is 
no doubt about that. 
C: Well, I had to smile when I asked you the question, be.cause have you 
ever heard any0ne say to anyone, what do you think i .s the role of artillery 
officers in Viet Nam? Or what do you think is the role of signal officers 
or infantry or any other such branches? 
A: N('), I never have. Have you? 
C: No. 
A: No, I' never have. 
C: And yet I thought of that as I said, talk to me about the ~ole of 
chaplat .ns ... 
A: Yeah, yeah. Yeah, I think •.. of course, chaplains are the. only ones·, you 
see, in the structure of the Army, chaplains are the only p ;l'.'ofes·s·i onal people 
who -move among the troops. 
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A: Doctors· don 1·t and even the old battalion snr<5eon, he stayed back a,t 
the oase camp. we had one that was scared of his, own shadow. We ha.d anotner 
one who came out to the fire support base through my urging. We g0t to be 
good buddies. But he wasn't about to go out there and spend too much time; 
there was no need for it, because after all, he is there to minister to the 
physical needs, and what if he gets killed, you know. And, you know-, it•s 
..• you can say that about the chaplain, but my skills are a. more intrinsic 
thing; his are ex ternal and they need the guy. So •.. but you sure don't have 
lawyers out there and .•. 
C: Well, occasionally, and then somebody is in trouble. 
A-: Yeah., yeah, that I s right. That's exactly right. So. = .geez, I' don •·t 
Rnow where else to go. 
C: r don't either. I think we have talked, pretty well through the whole 
thing. 
A; Yeah, I don't know from my perspective where else for us, to go, but 
in kind of general reflections, r don't know ... I have some -mixed feelings-, you 
know-, that r would share with you. Now, one of them is kind of a, almost total 
disillusion, oecause you know, I have not talked about this before, r just 
reflected upon it, it just reinforced my feelings of futility. r mean just 
utter futility, and a lot of really churning in my guts, so to spea,R, because 
when I think of just the guys who I have known who were killed and-mai'med other~ 
w;tse, and all the effects upon their families, you know-, just rG?create tha.t 
experience, .of things like, you know, a friendly fire, just from my little 
old unit, just hundreds of time over, you know how- in the world do you replace 
a. guy, a kid like this Melocherchek (.sp?), this Polish. kid from Lakawana- Csp?I 
New- Ye>rk, you krn~w, whose whole life is ahead of him, you know, to realize 
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A: all of it,.really the futility of it is, what did a kid like tfiat give 
his life for, you know, as I'm talking about it now, thinking, gee whiz, 
you know, what an absolute waste. You know, instead of kicking tlie wa,r 
protesters, we should have been cheering them on. And under the present 
concept, given the same situation, what to do again, and I don't know'. 
Although we did have some chaplains who strongly opposed the war, who in one 
form or another, ministered. I didn't oppose it. You know, I don 1· t know 
what I would have done. I don't know what, you know, as I'm thinking aoout 
it now, looks like with some truth and honesty from the very beginning, we 
-might could have avoided the thing, or at least went in with a different 
concept. And when you get to thinking in those terms, it appears that tne 
only blame that yi::iu have to put on them has to be military people, · 
C: The longer I thought about it, I don't know that I a;m right, hut it ~s-
just that the longer I have thought about it, the more it seems to -me tfiat 
the blame lies not with the politicians but with. the. military. The military 
misTepre·sented the s·ituation to the politicians and to themselves, ... 
A: Yeah. 
C; ·for seven plus years. 
Ac Yeah. And the natural thing that falls out, at leas·t tq-me, ;i:.s in terms, 
of future. You know, what does that mean in terms of the future: future wars·, 
you know·, where do we stand? When a guy does get ready to tell the truth, 
what about a place like Korea, you know, in a situation like that; is he 
right, is he wrong and what should be done; should we pull into maybe some 
kind of isolationist position. What should we do? I don 1 t know~ 
C: Well, I don 1 t either, 3erry, Except if we are involved overseas· a9ain 
we ought to be involved in a situation with really (llnintelligiblel. --men or 
else refuse to get tnyqlyed. 
I 0 
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Ae Yeah, yeah, I think you are precisely right. I think you are precisely 
rigfit . 
Ce And if I have any theme, I guess that's one of them that I would push. 
Ce This ends my recording with Jerry Autry, conducted on '.Monday, and Tuesday,. 
during August of 1977. 
